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Article
Rise of Police Unions on the
Back of the Black Liberation Movement
AYESHA BELL HARDAWAY
Police unions have garnered the attention of the media and some scholars in
recent years. That attention has often focused on exploring the seemingly
inexplicable and routine power police unions have to shield problem officers from
accountability. This Article shows that police union power did not surreptitiously
arrive on the doorsteps of American cities. Instead, collective bargaining rights for
law enforcement began to gain firm footing during the 1960s as white Americans
remained committed to preserving their place in the nation’s racial hierarchy as it
related to housing, jobs, education, and entertainment. Existing legal scholarship
has successfully highlighted the depth and breadth of modern-day union contracts
and the undemocratic manner by which problematic provisions within those
contracts have been negotiated. This Article adds to that research by explaining how
the social and political interests of both the electors and the elected merged with the
demands of officers sworn to protect their specific interests. Law enforcement served
as the first line of attack against efforts to free Black communities from police abuses
during the 1960s. Police organizations amassed political power during their fight
against Black liberation. That power netted them collective bargaining rights and
secured mayoral seats for “law and order” candidates during the 1960s. It also
demonstrated America’s deep commitment to unchecked police violence. In short,
police unions have effectively accomplished their aim of impeding external inquiries
into officers’ actions and methods. Decades of concerns about police brutality have
followed. Any sincere effort to make police accountable must understand the origins
of police union power—and then use that understanding to explore how to excise
problematic collective bargaining provisions. The Article proposes the federal
government impose conditional-spending restrictions on state and local police
departments that fail to make demonstrable strides toward officer accountability by
removing collective bargaining protections that foster misconduct.
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Rise of Police Unions on the
Back of the Black Liberation Movement
AYESHA BELL HARDAWAY *
“[T]he Negro in America can scarcely yet be considered—
for example—as a part of the labor unions—and he is certainly
not so considered by the majority of these unions—and that,
therefore, he lacks that protection and that incentive. . . .
“Now, what I have said . . . is true of every Northern city with
a large Negro population. And the police are simply the hired
enemies of this population. They are present to keep the Negro
in his place and to protect white business interests, and they
have no other function.” 1
INTRODUCTION
Extrajudicial killings by American law enforcement prompted
unprecedented public demonstrations and outrage across the globe during
the summer of 2020.2 The highly publicized murder3 of George Floyd and

* Associate Professor of Law, Director of the Social Justice Law Center at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, and Co-Director of the Social Justice Institute at Case Western Reserve
University. My sincere gratitude to my colleagues Jonathan Adler, Jessica Berg, Avidan Cover,
Jonathan Entin, Jessie Hill, Dale Nance, Andrew Pollis, and Cassandra Robertson for their feedback.
To Joseph Slater for his insightful comments and feedback. Special appreciation to Taja-Nia
Henderson, Alexis Washington, and the Lutie A. Lytle Black Women Law Faculty Workshop and
Writing Retreat. Special thanks to SaraJean Petite and Andrew Dorchak for their research assistance. I
must also express an abundance of gratitude to the Connecticut Law Review editors for their
professionalism and thoughtful suggestions.
1 James
Baldwin, A Report from Occupied Territory, NATION (July 11, 1966),
https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/report-occupied-territory.
2 Kristina Roth & Alli McCracken Jarrar, Justice for George Floyd: A Year of Global Activism for
Black Lives and Against Police Violence, AMNESTY INT’L (May 24, 2021), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/campaigns/2021/05/justice-for-george-floyd-a-year-of-global-activism-for-black-lives-and-againstpolice-violence (“The United States recorded its largest protests in the history of the country’s existence.
People from Indonesia to New Zealand, from Switzerland to Argentina and beyond all took action in
different ways, both online and offline, to demand justice for George Floyd, and show solidarity with the
rights of Black people to survive interactions with law enforcement and the Black Lives Matter struggle
in the United States.”).
3 Sentencing Order and Memorandum Opinion at 1, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646
(D. Minn. June 25, 2021) (“This matter is before the Court for sentencing after the jury returned guilty
verdicts on April 20, 2021 on Count I, unintentional second-degree murder while committing a felony,
Count II, third-degree murder, perpetrating an eminently dangerous act evincing a depraved mind, and
Count III, second-degree manslaughter, culpable negligence creating an unreasonable risk.”).
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killing4 of Breonna Taylor caught the attention of even those who saw,
reportedly for the first time, the brutal disregard law enforcement can have
for Black life.5 Lifelong organizers, elected officials, community sages,
scholars, and journalists, along with the previously willfully or otherwise
unaware, all seemed to be in conversations about how to prevent “another
George Floyd.”6 Others more pointedly discussed how to prevent
individuals repeatedly accused of using excessive force, like Floyd’s
murderer, Derek Chauvin, from remaining employed as officers. 7
Officers were never charged or convicted of state offenses related to Breonna Taylor’s March 13,
2020, homicide. This was true despite reported outrage from grand jurors who considered the actions of
officers involved in the botched raid of Taylor’s apartment that resulted in her death. Grand jurors
reported being presented with evidence related to the raid over the course of two and a half days only to
find out at the end that six possible homicide charges under Kentucky law were not among the charges
they were being asked to consider. Also, Taylor was not among the list of identified potential victims—
only individuals in a neighboring apartment were so identified. See Elizabeth Joseph, Breonna Taylor
Grand Jurors Say There Was an “Uproar” When They Realized Officers Wouldn’t Be Charged with Her
Death, CNN (Oct. 30, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/29/us/breonna-taylor-grandjurors/index.html; see also Coroner’s Investigative Report No. 20-614-1032, JEFFERSON CNTY. (KY.)
CORONER’S OFF. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://louisville-police.org/DocumentCenter/View/1816/PIU-20019-Medical-Reports (identifying Taylor’s cause of death as “[m]ultiple (5) [g]unshot [w]ounds of the
body”). Nearly twenty-nine months after her killing, the U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal charges
against four Louisville Metro Police Department officers involved in obtaining and executing the search
warrant that resulted in Taylor’s death. See David Nakamura et al., Four Officers Involved in Breonna
Taylor’s Killing Face Federal Charges, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2022, 6:18 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/04/breonna-taylor-federal-charges-fbi-garland/.
5 Luke Martin, A Year Later, How George Floyd’s Killing Opened These Kansas City Residents’
Eyes, NPR (May 20, 2021, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/20/998709176/a-year-later-how-thegeorge-floyds-killing-opened-these-kansas-city-residents-ey (“The police killing of George Floyd last
May didn't just prompt protests around the world—it opened the eyes of many who had never before
embraced racial justice. . . . ‘I'm sure there's some police brutality out there. And honestly, I do believe
that Blacks are treated differently than whites.”)
A 2016 Monmouth University poll found that “34 percent of Americans said police were more
likely to use excessive force if a suspect is [B]lack,” and a March 2020 poll said this percentage increased
to fifty-seven percent. Anna North, White Americans Are Finally Talking About Racism. Will It Translate
into Action?, VOX (June 11, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/11/21286642/george-floydprotests-white-people-police-racism.
6 Matt Vasilogambros, Training Police to Step In and Prevent Another George Floyd, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (June 5, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2020/06/05/training-police-to-step-in-and-prevent-another-george-floyd; Daniel Buck, To Prevent Another
George Floyd Tragedy, We Must Fix Police Unions, FEDERALIST (June 3, 2020), https://thefederalist.com/
2020/06/03/prevent-george-floyd-tragedy-fix-police-unions; Michael Riccardi, Rep. Introduces Bill to
Outlaw Use of Chokeholds, PA. L. WKLY., Apr. 27, 2021, at 9 (quoting Pennsylvania state representative
Stephen Kinsey as saying, “My bill provides an opportunity to ensure that police are held accountable for
their actions so that we don’t have another George Floyd, Eric Garner, Ricky Bellevue or other unarmed
Black and brown lives claimed by these malicious chokeholds”) Aryanna Prasad, Seahawks Speak Out
About Death of George Floyd, FANNATION (May 31, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.si.com/nfl/seahawks/
news/seahawks-speak-out-about-the-death-of-george-floyd (noting NFL player D.J. Fluker “encouraged
minorities to apply to become police officers to ‘rewrite the training book’ [and] telling followers to ‘get
yourself in there and help prevent another George Floyd from happening’”).
7 Dakin Andone et al., The Minneapolis Police Officer Who Knelt on George Floyd’s Neck Had 18
Previous Complaints Against Him, Police Department Says, CNN (May 29, 2020, 5:39 PM),
4
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As some looked for solutions to the longstanding problem of excessive
police violence, attention turned to the role of police unions. In what ways
do police unions8 make it difficult to hold officers accountable for serious
instances of misconduct? And in what ways do police unions promote the
undocumented, but often well-recognized, culture of a department? Or do
they merely serve as a reflection of the majority of their members? Derek
Chauvin appeared eerily familiar and coldly comfortable with having his
knee on Floyd’s neck for at least nine minutes and twenty-nine seconds.9
The aggressive show of force, often referred to as the “warrior” approach to
policing,10 was undeniable. Journalists soon reported that the Police Officers
Federation of Minneapolis sponsored annual training on “killology” at no
cost to the city.11 The union did so in 2019 (a year before the killing of
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/us/minneapolis-officer-complaints-george-floyd/index.html; Kim Barker
& Serge F. Kovaleski, Officer Who Pressed His Knee on George Floyd’s Neck Drew Scrutiny Long
Before, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html (Mar.
29, 2021); Jamiles Lartey & Abbie VanSickle, “Don’t Kill Me”: Others Tell of Abuse by Officer Who
Knelt on George Floyd, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/us/derek-chauvin-georgefloyd-past-cases.html (Apr. 22, 2021).
8 Throughout this Article, I use the phrases “police unions,” “police associations,” and “police
organizations” interchangeably. While a main focus of this Article involves the presence or absence of
official collective bargaining rights, I alternate use of these three phrases to refer to those sworn individuals
who participate in organized lobbying and/or engage in litigation on behalf of police officers, regardless
of precisely when they secured collective bargaining rights during the 1960s. The following definition of
police unions is sufficient for the purposes of this Article: “an employee organization which deals with
police agency management in a systematic way with respect to questions of wages, hours, and conditions
of work.” Hervey A. Juris, The Implications of Police Unionism, 6 L. & SOC’Y REV. 231, 234 (1971).
9 Steve Karnowski & Tammy Webber, Lung Expert Testifies George Floyd Died Because His
Breathing Was Restricted, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 7, 2022, 5:02 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
nation/lung-expert-testifies-george-floyd-died-because-his-breathing-was-restricted (“Floyd died because
his upper airway was compressed by Officer Derek Chauvin’s knee, while his position on the hard asphalt
with his hands cuffed behind his back—as two other officers helped hold him down—did not allow his
lungs to expand, Dr. David Systrom [testified]. That restricted the flow of oxygen and raised carbon
dioxide levels in his body. . . . ‘Oxygen delivered to the heart and brain is critical to survival,’ Systrom
said, later calling Floyd’s death ‘an eminently reversible respiration failure event.’”); CNN Tonight (CNN
television broadcast Mar. 30, 2021) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
2103/30/cnnt.01.html) (interviewing firefighter Genevieve Hansen, who said, “Officer Chauvin seemed
comfortable with the majority of his weight balanced on top of Mr. Floyd's neck”); Jonathan Allen,
“It Wasn't Right”: Teen Who Filmed George Floyd’s Death Confronts Ex-Policeman at Trial,
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2021, 6:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-race-georgefloyd-videoidCAKBN2BM391 (quoting Darnella Frazier as saying, “He had this cold look, heartless . . . . He didn’t
care what we were saying, it didn’t change anything he was doing.”); Suzette Hackney, Opinion,
May Derek Chauvin's Lack of Remorse as He Heads to Prison Be His Final Insult to George Floyd ,
USA TODAY (June 25, 2021, 7:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/06/25/derekchauvin-carolyn-pawlenty-no-apology-george-floyd-family/7778178002/ (“Chauvin smirked as he
listened to Floyd's pleas and those from onlookers. But he never let up.”); Government’s Trial Brief at 3,
United States v. Thao, No. 0:21-cr-00108 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2022) (“Chauvin did not remove his knees
from Mr. Floyd’s body for the next 9 minutes and 29 seconds . . . .”).
10 Bryan Schatz, Killer Instincts, MOTHER JONES, Mar.–Apr. 2017, at 28, 29.
11 Inae Oh, Minneapolis Banned Warrior-Style Police Training. Its Police Union Kept Offering It
Anyway, MOTHER JONES (May 28, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/05/
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George Floyd) after the mayor in Minneapolis decided to ban warrior-style
training, which he said did not comport with proper use of force and
de-escalation requirements.12 The union denounced the mayor’s decision as
unlawful.13 After promising to fight the city, the union made the training
available to Minneapolis officers still interested in receiving it.14
The power wielded by the union in Minneapolis is not unique, nor is it
new. But the role of police unions in policing and police violence is
understudied. Policing expert Samuel Walker called attention to the dearth of
research on police unions in 2008.15 Since that time, scholars have explored16

bob-kroll-minneapolis-warrior-police-training/; Libor Jany, Minneapolis Police Union Offers Free
“Warrior” Training, in Defiance of Mayor’s Ban, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 24, 2019, 9:28 PM),
https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-police-union-offers-free-warrior-training-in-defiance-of-mayors-ban/509025622/ (“[T]he union that represents the city’s roughly 900 rank-and-file police officers
announced that it is partnering with a national police organization to offer free ‘warrior-style’ training
for any officer who wants it.”); Melissa Segura, There’s One Big Reason Why Police Brutality is
So Common in the U.S. and That’s the Police Unions, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 1, 2020, 7:05
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/melissasegura/police-unions-history-minneapolis-reformgeorge-floyd.
12 Jany, supra note 11.
13 Id.
14 Danny Spewak, Minneapolis Police Officers Now Banned from “Warrior-Style” Training,
KARE 11 (Apr. 19, 2019, 3:40 AM), https://www.kare11.com/article/news/mpd-officers-now-bannedfrom-warrior-style-training/89-240421f4-7d10-4034-853b-cfcbc410c0c5; Segura, supra note 11.
15 Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas of
American Policing, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 95, 95 (2008).
16 I, along with several scholars, have specifically focused on police unions and the various ways
they serve as roadblocks to reform efforts. See, e.g., Ayesha Bell Hardaway, Time Is Not on Our Side:
Why Specious Claims of Collective Bargaining Rights Should Not Be Allowed to Delay Police Reform
Efforts, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 137, 137–38 (2019) (detailing how police union efforts to intervene in
Department of Justice–initiated police consent decrees have served to impede reform progress);
Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 712 (2017)
(exploring how labor law can impact organizational change in police unions); Rachel A. Harmon, The
Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012) (identifying collective bargaining agreements
as deterrents to the prevention of unconstitutional police practices); Stephen Rushin, Police Union
Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1192 (2017) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Union Contracts] (analyzing 178
police union contracts to illustrate how they impede accountability efforts); Seth W. Stoughton, The
Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2211 (2014) (arguing collective bargaining
agreement provisions related to disciplinary grievances impede the discipline of officers); Samuel
Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms
Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 72 (2012) (discussing how unions use political leverage to
elect mayors who are more inclined to appoint police chiefs who are not committed to leading
organizations that insist on accountability); Stephen Rushin & Allison Garnett, State Labor Law and
Federal Police Reform, 51 GA. L. REV. 1209 (2017); Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Collective
Bargaining Rights and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida, 38 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1–2 (2022)
(finding the introduction of collective bargaining rights for sheriffs’ deputies in Florida in 2003
significantly increased the incidence of violent misconduct); see also Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1246 (2016) (proposing that Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights
(“LEOBOR”) provisions serve as the framework for expanding non-sworn community member rights
during criminal investigations and interrogations).

2022]

RISE OF POLICE UNIONS

185

how union contracts impede officer accountability.17 It is well known that
conflict between law enforcement and Black communities across the country
boiled over throughout the 1960s.18 What has been less explored is how
backlash to Black liberation during the 1960s granted police unions the power
to dictate the policy and culture of municipal policing. Understanding the
origins of police unions is essential to understand the persistence of police
violence. To be successful, efforts to eradicate the culture of police brutality
must confront the ways in which collective bargaining provisions stymie
accountability. Indeed, avoiding accountability has been a core purpose of
many police unions.
Some current conversations about the problem of American policing
include discussions of the role and impact of police unions.19 Recently, it
seems that inquiries on how to hold police accountable resurface with each
high-profile officer-involved killing or instance of police misconduct.20 And
for good reason. Examples abound of instances of prior misconduct and
abuse by officers involved in recent killings of community members.
Deputy Michael Jason Meade, known to improperly use his religious
faith to justify using force, shot and killed Casey Goodson, Jr.21 Officer
Jason Van Dyke, the subject of twenty citizen complaints, shot and killed

17 The word accountability is used often in policing scholarship and throughout this Article. See
SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 7 (2001) [hereinafter
WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY] (providing a definitional framework for two distinct functions of
police accountability in a democratic society where police are theoretically accountable to the people and
to the law: police should (1) be responsive to the people and to elected officials, and (2) conform with
due process and equal protection requirements of the law.)
18 Id. at 25 (stating that there was a “police-community relations crisis” in the 1960s).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Miriam Wasser, Phoenix Cop Who Killed Michelle Cusseaux Violated Department
Policy, PPD Board Rules, PHX. NEW TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015, 5:10 PM), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/
news/phoenix-cop-who-killed-michelle-cusseaux-violated-department-policy-ppd-board-rules-7670775
(noting that the fatal shooting of Michelle Cusseaux by Phoenix police “remained a local rallying cry for
police reform, racial justice, and an overhaul in police training” because it came days after Michael
Brown was killed in Ferguson, Missouri); Joe Castle & Chandler Boese, What to Know About Adam Coy,
Ex-Columbus Officer Charged with Murder in Andre Hill’s Death, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Feb. 4, 2021,
2:49 PM), https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/local/2021/02/04/andre-hill-shooting-columbus-officercoys-history-discipline-firing/4386008001 (noting that the city council unanimously approved Andre’s
Law, “an ordinance that could lead to criminal charges for officers who fail to turn on body cameras or
render first aid to a citizen injured by police,” in the wake of Hill’s shooting).
Police also killed Lajuana Phillips, Crystal Danielle Ragland, Latasha Nicole Walton, and April
Webster, but media coverage of Black women killed by police is often lacking. Alex Samuels et al., Why
Black Women Are Often Missing from Conversations About Police Violence, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May
6, 2021), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-black-women-are-often-missing-from-conversationsabout-police-violence/.
21 Danae King, Deputy Who Killed Casey Goodson Has Used Faith to Justify Use of Force Before,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Dec. 29, 2020, 6:24 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2020/12/29/
who-jason-meade-deputy-who-killed-casey-goodson-columbus-ohio/4008670001.
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Laquan McDonald.22 Officer Daniel Pantaleo, whose disciplinary record
“indicate[d] a chronic history of complaints . . . among the worst on the
force,” killed Eric Garner by using a prohibited chokehold.23 Officer
Timothy Loehmann, who was recommended for termination from a previous
position after a supervisor noted his unfitness, shot and killed Tamir Rice.24
Officer Adam Coy, with ninety civilian complaints filed against him, shot
and killed Andre Hill.25 Patrolman Scott Aldridge had violated use of force
policies and lied about his conduct years before he was involved in the death
of Tanisha Anderson, whom family said police slammed to the ground
during a mental-health episode.26 The Medical Examiner’s report ruled her
death a homicide.27
These incidents have led some to question how problem officers have
been allowed to remain on the job. Scholars,28 organizations,29 and
journalists30 have examined how police unions impede officer
Johanna Wald, Chicago Cop Jason Van Dyke’s Record Was a Warning Sign, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Oct. 28, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/28/warning-signswere-clear-before-laquan-mcdonald-s-murder.
23 Carimah Townes & Jack Jenkins, EXCLUSIVE DOCUMENTS: The Disturbing Secret History
of the NYPD Officer Who Killed Eric Garner, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 21, 2017, 2:09 PM),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/daniel-pantaleo-records-75833e6168f3/; Sonia Moghe, Disciplinary
Record of Ex-Officer Who Held Eric Garner in Chokehold Is Finally Released, CNN (June 23, 2020,
11:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/23/us/eric-garner-officer-misconduct-complaints/index.html.
See generally Daniel Pantaleo, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/4290daniel-pantaleo (last visited Oct. 16, 2022).
24 Joshua Barajas, Cleveland Police Officer Who Shot Tamir Rice Was Unfit for Duty Years Ago,
Records Show, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 3, 2014, 7:15 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/
cleveland-police-office-shot-tamir-rice-unfit-duty-years-ago-police-reports-show (reporting Independence
(Ohio) Police Department deputy chief Jim Polak “did not believe Loehmann was mature enough to work
at IPD, due to a ‘dangerous loss of composure during live range training and his inability to manage this
personal stress.’”); Matthew Haag, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Is Hired by an Ohio Police
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/timothy-loehmanntamir-rice-shooting.html (reporting the police department in Bellaire, Ohio, hired Loehmann after he
killed Rice).
25 Castle & Boese, supra note 20.
26 Brandon Blackwell, Cleveland Cop Involved in Tanisha Anderson Death Lied About Past Useof-Force Case, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 16, 2015, 3:33 PM), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2015/01/
cleveland_cop_involved_in_tani.html.
27 Cory Shaffer, Tanisha Anderson Was Restrained in Prone Position; Death Ruled Homicide,
CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 2, 2015, 4:23 PM), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2015/01/tanisha_
anderson_was_restraine.html.
28 See Paul F. Clark, Why Police Unions Are Not Part of the American Labor Movement,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 25, 2020, 3:18 PM), https://theconversation.com/why-police-unions-are-not-partof-the-american-labor-movement-142538; see also sources cited supra note 16.
29 See, e.g., GRACE SINNOTT ET AL., ACLU OF CONN., BARGAINED AWAY 3 (2020),
https://www.acluct.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/bargained_away_2020.pdf; Fair Police
Contracts, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://campaignzero.org/contracts.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2022).
30 See, e.g., Noam Scheiber et al., How Police Unions Became Such Powerful Opponents to Reform
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/us/police-unions-minneapolis-kroll.html
(Apr. 2, 2021); Michael H. Keller & Kim Barker, Police Unions Won Power Using His Playbook. Now
22
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accountability. Some politicians and police reform experts point to the
unchecked power of police unions.31 Scholars have gone one step further by
identifying collective bargaining contracts as the source of that unchecked
power.32 No one has yet explored the alignment of anti-Black sociopolitical
interests that prompted governments to grant police officers the right to
collectively bargain in the first place.
Contractual provisions for officers in jurisdictions with law enforcement
collective bargaining rights have been singled out as contributing to a
national police culture that overlooks dastardly policing and protects the
employment security of officers at the expense of policed communities.33
Elected and appointed officials unaware or unwilling to assert managerial
authority risk agreeing to contractual provisions that impede reform efforts.34
The pro-law-and-order,35 anti-Black enforcement interests36 present in
America before, during, and after the rise of police unions compose a strong
political force.
This Article details the explosion of public safety collective bargaining
rights during the 1960s. In doing so, it also discusses how those rights were
He’s Negotiating the Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/10/
us/police-unions.html; Daniel DiSalvo, The Trouble with Police Unions, NAT’L AFFS. (Fall 2020),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-police-unions; Dylan Matthews,
How Police Unions Became So Powerful—and How They Can Be Tamed, VOX (June 24, 2020, 9:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21290981/police-union-contracts-minneapolis-reform.
31 Although police union leaders frequently criticize elected officials, Mayor Jacob Frey of
Minneapolis was one of the rare politicians to direct criticism at the police unions:
The elephant in the room with regard to police reform is the police union. The elephant
in the room with regard to making the changes necessary to combat the institutionalized
racism—and have a full-on culture shift—is the police union, the contract associated
with that union, and then the arbitration that ultimately is necessary.
The Daily, The Mayor of Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES, at 6:46 (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/03/podcasts/the-daily/jacob-frey-george-floyd-protests-minneapolis.html; see also Scheiber et
al., supra note 30 (quoting Minneapolis councilman Stephen Fletcher as saying, “[i]t operates a little bit
like a protection racket”).
32 Clark, supra note 28.
33 Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 16, at 1204–07.
34 Id.
35 The phrase “law and order” promotes the misconception that legality and social order go hand in
hand. However, as Jerome Skolnick discusses, there are societies where social order and control are
prioritized without any legal protections for individuals. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL
6–9 (1966) (“In short, ‘law’ and ‘order’ are frequently found to be in opposition, because law implies
rational restraint upon the rules and procedures utilized to achieve order. Order under law, therefore,
subordinates the ideal of conformity to the ideal of legality.”).
36 Anti-Black enforcement strategies, often presented as an allegiance to law and order, can exist
when authorities either (1) disproportionately punish conduct or behavior of Black people in relation to
that of people of other races, or (2) pass statutes aimed at criminalizing attire and personal conduct
typically found in Black culture (i.e., sagging pants offenses, nuisance laws). See JAMES FOREMAN, JR.,
LOCKING UP OUR OWN 151–84 (2017). The insidious nature of racism rooted in white supremacy can
affect Black people or other people of color. Non-whites are not immune from adopting, advocating, and
even demanding pro-police law-and-order enforcement to the sole detriment of Black people. See id.
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granted simultaneous to a strong backlash against Black liberation. The
Article goes on to posit that the success of police unions during this time was
not coincidental, but instead a product, in some distinct measure, of law
enforcement’s exploitation and denigration of the Black Freedom Movement.
This project seeks to counter beliefs that police unions are unchecked,
self-empowering entities. Instead, they are largely the product of America’s
anti-Black sociopolitical climate. This Article details a portion of the origins
of police unions during the 1960s. It connects the rise of police unions and
individual leaders to the continued brutal treatment of Black community
members during that time. To be sure, this lone Article does not aim to cover
all of the political realities that gave rise to widespread police unionization
from 1965 to the present. Instead, it describes some of the ways that police
union interests and activities served to quell progress of the 1960s Black
liberation movement.37 Doing so preserved white local interests and power.
In short, police associations secured collective bargaining rights, in no small
part, because of the converging interests of police and elected officials who
sought to destroy Black liberation efforts.
This is the first in a series of articles that explores the political rise of
police unions and its accompanying contractual legal landscape over the
last five decades. It proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a historical
overview of the Black liberation movement from the late 1950s through the
early 1960s. It also briefly discusses the history of police unionization
efforts from the early 1900s until 1960. Part II details how police
associations in selected cities successfully used local courts and public
support for “law-and-order” policing to harness power and limit municipal
authority to address police brutality in predominately Black communities.
Part III explores how police unions successfully personified their
professional roles in law enforcement as a de facto protected class—
foreshadowing the current Blue Lives Matter organization—and galvanized
political support largely from the white electorate in selected cities. This
section details the notorious political rise of police officers to elected office
amid public support for racially targeted police practices, even as survey
results published by the American Academy of Art and Sciences concluded
that “white Americans . . . do not want a racist government and that they
will not follow racist leaders.”38 The Article concludes with a solution that
37 The term Black liberation used throughout this Article is aligned with Hasan Jeffries’s
articulation of Black freedom as the struggle of Black people to secure both civil rights and human rights
stretching back to the moment the first enslaved Africans were brought to what became the colony of
Virginia in 1619 and extending beyond the Black Power movement of the 1960s and 1970s. See Hasan
Kwame Jeffries, Freedom Rights: Reconsidering the Movement’s Goals and Objectives, in
UNDERSTANDING AND TEACHING THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 74–75 (Hasan Kwame Jeffries ed.,
2019) (describing civil rights as the liberty achieved through the passage of laws and human rights as the
entitlement to basic rights by virtue of birth).
38 Paul B. Sheatsley, White Attitudes Toward the Negro, 95 DAEDALUS 217, 237 (1966),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED013274.pdf.
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revisits and expands upon a prior proposal to utilize federal
conditional-spending requirements with local law enforcement agencies
found to have racially motivated pattern-or-practice violations sufficiently
connected to collective bargaining provisions in that jurisdiction.
I.

BLACK LIBERATION AND POLICE UNIONIZATION

U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1954 to 1960 signaled strong
judicial support for racial equality in America. The Court handed down
decisions that marked an end to legally segregated public education,39 public
transportation in states and cities,40 and interstate transportation.41 Many
communities in the South, however, continued to operate under de facto
segregation.42 Nonviolent demonstrators used direct actions to serve as
litmus tests for white response.43 It was undeniably vicious. Black and white
people (men, women, and children) participating in sit-ins, Freedom Rides,
and marches were arrested, beat, attacked by dogs, firebombed, shot, and
hanged.44 Some of these attacks were broadcast on the evening news.45
A. Black Liberation—Beyond Civil Rights
It is not possible to include a comprehensive historical account of the
American Black liberation movement in a single law review article.46
However, some background on the goals of the movement and how law
enforcement served as an institutional enforcer of violence to thwart those
goals is essential.
Black liberation in the United States has been described as the collective
parts of the “civil rights militancy, nationalism, and anti-colonialism” in the

39

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
41 Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
42 Erica Frankenberg & Kendra Taylor, De Facto Segregation: Tracing a Legal Basis for
Contemporary Inequality, 47 J.L. & EDUC. 189, 192–95 (2018).
43 See infra text accompanying notes 50–54.
44 See RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, CONCRETE DEMANDS: THE SEARCH FOR BLACK POWER IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 70, 89 (2015) (on the “untold number of people who had suffered tremendously in the struggle
for freedom” by August 1963) [hereinafter RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS].
45 #Selma50: What the Media and Hollywood Got Wrong About “Bloody Sunday,” NBC NEWS (Mar.
8, 2015, 5:36 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/media-studies-selma-n319436 (“On Sunday
March 7, ABC’s news division made the consequential decision to break in to the network’s prime time
programming to show the Pettus Bridge horror. . . . Approximately 48 million people tuned in.”)
46 A number of activists and organizers have provided first-hand accounts of the philosophy, aims,
and strategy behind their Black liberation efforts. Likewise, a number of historians have documented the
details of the quest for Black freedom in America. In addition to the works cited here, see also ANGELA
DAVIS, ANGELA DAVIS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1974); ELAINE BROWN, A TASTE OF POWER: A BLACK
WOMAN’S STORY (1992); JEFFREY HAAS, THE ASSASSINATION OF FRED HAMPTON: HOW THE FBI AND
THE CHICAGO POLICE MURDERED A BLACK PANTHER (2011); AMY JACQUES GARVEY, BLACK POWER
IN AMERICA (1968).
40
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early 1960s.47 In Concrete Demands, historian Rhonda Y. Williams
succinctly described Black power as the outgrowth of “white illiberality and
oppression.”48 She explains that it is that reality from which Black people
developed a political framework that “placed less faith in white goodwill
and paid more attention to the structures of power.”49 By the mid-to-late
1960s, policing was certainly one of the power structures in America that
captured the attention of Black liberation leaders. But the struggle for
liberation did not start there.
Individual students, activists, and organizers, both nationally and
internationally, coalesced around the central topic of Black liberation during
the early 1960s.50 Though the groundwork for the liberation struggle was
laid prior to the sixties,51 the beginning of the decade featured increased
white violence against peaceful, nonviolent demonstrators. This included
widely disseminated news coverage of the February 1960 attack on North
Carolina A&T State University students’ sit-in at the Woolworth’s counter
in Greensboro.52 The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
was formed two months after the attack on those students.53 By the end of
1960, SNCC engaged a national network and organized sit-ins across the
country in more than two hundred cities.54
White violence met these nonviolent, aspiring liberators early and often.
It is relatively well known that the Freedom Riders were subjected to
unrelenting violence in the South from a staggering number of white people,
including police officers, during the interracial demonstration to test the
strength of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Boynton v. Virginia.55 Less
discussed is the extent of the violence suffered by Black people at the hands
of white people, both sworn and civilians, outside of the South. Elected
officials expended little energy to stop police and white vigilantes from
using violence to subvert Black liberation demonstrations.56 The federal
government refused to enforce the hard-fought protections purportedly

47

RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 70.
Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. at 70.
51 Id. at 71 (discussing sit-ins and Freedom Rides organized by the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE) during the 1940s and 1950s).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 72.
55 364 U.S. 454, 457, 459 (1960) (holding that racial segregation in public transportation violated
federal law). The Freedom Riders’ experience is related in RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 75–76.
56 See David M. Swiderski, Approaches to Black Power: African American Grassroots Political
Struggle in Cleveland, Ohio, 1960–1966, at 204 (Sept. 2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Massachusetts), https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/844; PETER B. LEVY, THE
GREAT UPRISING: RACE RIOTS IN URBAN AMERICA DURING THE 1960S, at 259 (2018).
48

2022]

RISE OF POLICE UNIONS

191

conferred to Black people.57 Federal deference to states’ rights and local
rules was used to support the federal government’s failure to intervene.58
Black liberation leaders worked to collectively raise awareness of the
ongoing racial subjugation experienced by Black people. Those organizing
to establish a life free from oppression and subjugation articulated the
objectives and guiding principles of their work early on. They developed
plans such as the “Declaration of Rights,” “Wants and Beliefs,” and “Ten
Principles,” as well as an earlier iteration of a “Ten-Point Program,”59 a
precursor to the more widely known Black Panthers’ “Ten Point Program.”60
It provided concrete steps local government should take to meet the
employment, health, and educational needs of Black people in Monroe,
North Carolina.61
The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was formed in Oakland,
California, in 1966.62 They organized nationally and formed chapters in
cities throughout the country.63 The Party’s “Ten Point Program” was central
to the organization’s work—it retained threads from earlier plans related to
economic, educational, and health relief.64 But as the obstinacy to liberation
evolved nationally, so did the threads in the Panther’s plan.65 The
57 See generally BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) (offering federalism as
the explanation for the Department of Justice’s refusal to provide protection to civil rights demonstrators).
58 Id.
59 RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 78. Robert Williams presented this early “Ten-Point
Program,” also known as the “Monroe Program,” in 1961. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, NEGROES WITH GUNS
39 (Wayne State Univ. Press 1998) (1962) [hereinafter ROBERT F. WILLIAMS]
60 The Black Panther Party Ten-Point Program (1966), B LACKPAST, https://www.blackpast.org/
african-american-history/primary-documents-african-american-history/black-panther-party-ten-pointprogram-1966/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2022).
61 See sources cited supra note 59.
62 The Black Panther Party, NAT’L A RCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/africanamericans/black-power/black-panthers (last visited Oct. 16, 2022).
63 RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 142.
64 Id. at 78, 142.
65 The program included the following points:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black community.
We want full employment for our people.
We want an end to the robbery by the Capitalists of our Black community.
We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.
We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent
American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in
the present day society.
6. We want all Black men to be exempt from military service.
7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of Black people.
8. We want freedom for all Black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.
9. We want all Black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their
peer group or people from their Black Communities, as defined by the Constitution of
the United States.
10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace.
The Black Panther Party, supra note 62.
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organization crystallized around concepts of Black unification and
self-determination, aimed at freeing Black people from the harms of
American subjugation.66 The continued reign of white terroristic violence by
both sworn and non-sworn individuals was identified as a direct threat to
Black freedom.67 The Black Panther Party drew the concerted ire of local
law enforcement and the FBI.68 Local and federal officials targeted the
organization and well-known leaders such as Stokely Carmichael,69 Huey
P. Newton,70 Fred Hampton,71 Angela Davis,72 and others. Those seeking to
upend racist laws and practices were met at times with “violent white power
in the form of armed white cops that enforce[d] those laws with guns and
nightsticks.”73 It is in this context that activists and organizers replaced their
prior philosophy of nonviolence with one of self-defense.74
Self-defense did not exclusively mean bearing arms. Black organizers
in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles instituted the Community
Action Patrol in 1965 to protect its community members from brazen
police violence and harassment. 75 The organization used CB radios,
66 Id.; Michael X. Delli Carpini, Black Panther Party: 1966–1982, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THIRD
PARTIES IN AMERICA 190, 191 (Immanuel Ness & James Ciment eds., 2000).
67 See The Black Panther Party Ten-Point Program (1966), supra note 60 (“We believe we can end
police brutality in our Black community by organizing Black self-defense groups that are dedicated to
defending our Black community from racist police oppression and brutality.”).
68 Documents released by the FBI pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act
regarding the Bureau’s counterintelligence activities are publicly available on the FBI website. Black
Extremist, FBI RECORDS: THE VAULT, https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/cointel-pro-black-extremists (last
visited Oct. 17, 2022). The documents, though heavily redacted, reveal that the FBI coordinated with
local law enforcement agencies to prevent: (1) Black liberation organizations from building coalitions;
(2) the rise of the Black “messiah” who would “unify” and “electrify” the movement; (3) violence from
the organizations; (4) the organizations and its leaders from gaining respect of the larger Black
community, the white community, and other Black liberation leaders; and (5) the organizations from
gaining youth support. Id. pt. 1, at 69–70. To achieve its goals, the FBI launched an aggressive attack on
people and organizations it deemed to be Black Extremist. The attack used repeated arrests by local
police, various forms of anonymous and pretext harassment, infiltration by spies, forgery, false
representations, advertisements through the media, and more. See, e.g., id. pt. 1, at 6–8, 60, 68, 87,
99–100, 107, 125, 131.
69 The FBI worked with local police in cities such as Boston and New York to target Stokely
Carmichael to disrupt, misdirect, neutralize, and frustrate his leadership efforts. Id. pt. 1, at 40, 52, 62.
70 Id. pt. 23, at 79, 200 (describing how the agency continued to surveil Newton despite his
incarcerated status).
71 Id. pt. 23, at 74 (revealing the coordinated effort between the FBI and local authorities regarding
the legal purchase of firearms by Black Panther Party members and how it could be used to make the
members “vulnerable to arrest”).
72 Id. pt. 23, at 140 (describing the plan to submit a forged letter to a local newspaper that
purportedly made a connection between Davis and some undisclosed persons accused of assaulting a
sheriff’s deputy in San Diego).
73 Stokely Carmichael, Toward Black Liberation, 7 MASS. REV. 639, 644 (1966) (discussing the
racial segregation and subjugation that oppressed Black people in American cities across the country and
left them without any control over their communities or the police who patrol them). Carmichael argues
the lack of power renders Black people unable to change these oppressive conditions. Id.
74 RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 76.
75 JEROME H. SKOLNICK , THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 152 (1969).
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notepads, and other technology to monitor police conduct in that
neighborhood.76 Some community members displayed “To Protect and
Observe” banners on their cars. 77
Community patrols in Watts were a precursor to the formation of the
Black Panther Party and its armed patrols of Oakland in 1966.78 It did not
take long for the California legislature, in May 1967, to criminalize the open
carrying of firearms in that state.79 This was a direct response to the
Panther’s armed patrols.80 As discussed in greater detail below, police union
and appointed officials’ actions during the 1960s sent a strong message that
self-determination and self-defense—core American values—were not to be
exercised by Black people in America without forcible resistance from
authorities.81 Policing scholars and other researchers have generally
described the “increased public hostility”82 in relations between police and
the Black community during the 1960s as a “crisis.”83
Important scholarship during that time and since has either explored in
great depth the progression of “police militancy” as the vehicle to unionize
political power84 or recounted the violent clashes between “black

76 The United States of Anxiety, To Protect and Observe: A History, WNYC S TUDIOS, at 3:40 (July
26, 2021), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/anxiety/episodes/protect-and-observe-history (an
interview of Ron Wilkins, who had been a 19-year-old volunteer with the Community Alert Patrol during
the mid-1960s, describing the “twenty-five to thirty” members’ efforts to protect the Black community
from police violence and recounting how an LAPD officer brutally shot Leonard Deadwyler during a
traffic stop in May 1966 as Deadwyler drove his pregnant wife to the hospital as she was in active labor);
see also “We Have to Get the Police Off Our Backs”: The Story Behind T.A.L.O. and the Community
Alert Patrol in Watts, MOVEMENT, Sept. 1966, at 5, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/
community.28040887.pdf (interview with community organizer Chester Wright on how the killing of
Deadwyler and treatment of his wife by police led to the creation of the Temporary Alliance of Local
Organizations (TALO) and their Community Alert Patrols in Watts).
77 The United States of Anxiety, supra note 76, at 6:15.
78 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 152; Michael X. Delli Carpini, supra note 66, at 192 (“The Black
Panthers formed ‘police patrols,’ first in Oakland and then, as the organization grew, in cities around
the country.”).
79 Arica L. Coleman, When the NRA Supported Gun Control, TIME, https://time.com/4431356/nragun-control-history/ (July 31, 2016).
80 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 152; Cynthia Deitle Leonardatos, California’s Attempts to Disarm
the Black Panthers, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 948 (1999) (“While many journal articles have been
written on the topic of race and guns, none have examined the history and motivations behind the
California Legislature’s decision to enact a gun control statute in 1967 for the purpose of disarming the
members of the Black Panther Party.”).
81 See infra Part III.
82 HERVEY A. JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM: POWER AND IMPACT IN PUBLIC-SECTOR
BARGAINING 19 (1973).
83 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 17, at 25.
84 Donald G. Alexander, Police Service Reforms Are Overdue, in THE POLICE R EBELLION : A QUEST
FOR BLUE POWER 40, 40–41 (William J. Bopp ed., 1971); JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 3.
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militants”85 and law-and-order police tactics. 86 Officials commended
officers for their conduct during “race riots” in Rochester, New York;
St. Augustine, Florida; Albany, Georgia; York, Pennsylvania; New York
City; and Philadelphia. 87 They praised officers despite widespread reports
of officer abuse and misconduct. 88 In many instances, officer abuse and
excessive force were the precipitating factors that led to uprisings across
the country. 89 Others reported that officers failed to provide service to Black
community members harmed by white gang members or vigilantes. 90 And
still yet, there were reports of police acting in concert with white gangs to
commit acts of racial violence and intimidation.91 The following subsection
explores the abrupt increase in police collective bargaining rights after
years of rejection.
B. Police Association Progress Toward Unionization
Others have provided detailed historical accounts of police
associations as social clubs seeking to join the labor movement as official
unions. 92 Though much of that background is not germane to this particular
Article, a brief history here is necessary to illustrate the significance of the
rapid acceleration of collective bargaining rights and to contextualize its
timing. Before the considerable and concerted backlash to Black liberation,
prior efforts by police associations to secure collective bargaining rights
netted no results.
Police associations were formed largely in the American northeast
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historical accounts
of the early beginnings of police organizations recount their role of
85 It is curious that the behavior of Black liberation activists was described as militant. History
shows that violence is more prevalent by groups looking to maintain America’s status quo of inequality
in the name of law and order. Black liberation activists and other proponents of racial progress are
routinely labeled as “militant.” As defined, however, that label more aptly fits those who act violently
under the guise of law and order to maintain racial hierarchy of white domination and Black subjugation.
Oxford English Dictionary defines “militant” as, “Aggressively active in pursuing a political or social
cause, and often favouring extreme, violent, or confrontational methods.” Militant, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/118418 (March 2022).
86 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 126–27; LEVY, supra note 56.
87 See, e.g., Mansfield Praises Police in Race Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1964, at 11,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1964/08/01/118533911.pdf; Thomas A. Johnson, U.S.
Studies Riot in Philadelphia; Liberties Union Welcomes Move, Charging Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1967, at 71, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/11/19/98608917.pdf. The mayor
of York, Pennsylvania, disregarded complaints about the use of police dogs to attack and intimidate Black
people, including children. Instead, he erected a police dog monument, praised the dogs for making the
city safer, and pledged to get more if necessary. LEVY, supra note 56, at 261.
88 LEVY, supra note 56, at 251, 278.
89 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 3–4 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION]
90 LEVY, supra note 56, at 240–41, 251, 270, 272.
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 30.
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providing general support and social gatherings for officers. But some of the
earliest organizations also made significant strides in advocating for better
work conditions. The Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) in New
York City started in 1892.93 It was reportedly known as a professional police
organization by 1898.94 One of its earliest lobbying successes netted
eight-hour workdays for officers.95 The state of New York was also home to
early police associations in two other cities. Buffalo officers formed the Erie
Club in 1894, just two years after the PBA.96 In addition, officers in
Rochester formed the Locust Club, a reference to their nightsticks’ type of
wood, in 1907.97 The three organizations in New York were followed by the
Milwaukee Policemen’s Protective Association in 1908, an unnamed
association in the District of Columbia in 1908, and Pittsburgh’s Fraternal
Order of Police Lodge #1 in 1915.98 The organization behind the Boston
police strike of 1919 rounds out the early twentieth century and is often
characterized as historically significant for drastically hindering momentum
for police unionism.99
The Rochester Police Department’s Locust Club and the Boston police
strike addressed concerns about low compensation and lengthy shifts of
officers within those departments.100 Historical documents about those
associations also contain information regarding the organizational
structure, important dates, and even details regarding name origin.101
Another source discusses the contentious battles between the New York
Police Department, the PBA, the Sergeant’s Benevolent Association, and
city officials from the 1940s to the 1960s regarding representation
authority, rights to the grievance process, and the political calculations of
all involved. 102 Non-sworn public sector workers were gaining union rights
around the same time. But it is widely recognized that police associations
gained lightning-speed success in securing collective bargaining rights
93

MARK JONES & PETER JOHNSTONE, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 329 (2011).
JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 15; LEONARD RUCHELMAN, POLICE POLITICS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE CITIES 15 (1974) (discussing the historical development of the NYPD
PBA and identifying the date it began as a professional organization).
95 JONES & JOHNSTONE , supra note 93, at 329.
96 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 15.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 17. The strike also made Calvin Coolidge a national figure. As governor of Massachusetts,
he took a hard line against the police strikers. It propelled him to the Republican national ticket in 1920
and to the presidency after President Harding died in 1923. Id. at 16; Richard L. Lyons, The Boston Police
Strike of 1919, 20 NEW ENG. Q. 147, 165 (1947) (quoting Coolidge as writing, “There is no right to strike
against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime.”)
100 Charles Clottin, The Evolution of the Rochester Police Department Locust Club 3 (unpublished
manuscript), https://locustclub.org/sites/default/files/locustclub_history.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2022);
Lyons, supra note 99, at 148.
101 See generally sources cited supra note 99.
102 MARGARET ANNE LEVI, CONFLICT AND COLLUSION: POLICE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, TECH.
REP. 07-74, at 42–44 (1974), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/17457NCJRS.pdf.
94
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during the 1960s. Juris and Feuille apportion some of that success to the
tight labor market of the 1950s, the collective bargaining success of
teachers in New York City, and the national conversation spurred by
President Kennedy’s 1962 executive order giving federal employees
bargaining power. 103
In the 1960s, police organizations were able to accomplish in one decade
what they had failed to in the previous fifty-plus years: the right to
collectively bargain over wages and other employment benefits. Juris and
Feuille’s seminal work, Police Unionism: Power and Impact in
Public-Sector Bargaining, provides a timely and extensive account of the
evolution of police unions.104 Their research involved a field study of what
the authors identify as “twenty-two urban areas.”105 Framed in some ways
as a response to Skolnick’s highly regarded and influential Politics of
Protest, the work is specifically positioned as an attempt to address the
authors’ concerns that police unions were being painted in a negative light
by “misinformation and fear of the unknown.”106 It sought to provide insight
into police unions that were identified as strong economic and political
institutions but had gone “largely unobserved and virtually unstudied.”107
Police associations failed to make any substantial headway in the quest
to secure collective bargaining rights from 1919 until the 1960s.108 Though
police associations were widespread by 1960, the vast majority of those
entities were not recognized as official bargaining units.109 Public employee
efforts to unionize and strike, particularly among the ranks of police and fire,
were viewed as anti-American challenges to the sovereign authority of

103 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 12, 15; Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959–1963);
see also LEVI, supra note 102, at 42–44 (detailing how the PBA hired large law firms to utilize the court
system to pursue access to the grievance processes detailed in the Little Wagner Act (not collective
bargaining rights)); see infra note 127, after efforts to use political, public, and labor affiliation power
with the Teamsters failed).
104 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 12, 15.
105 Id. at 4.
106 Id. at 1; see generally SKOLNICK, supra note 75.
107 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 3. There were studies of the police as an institution, and some
of those studies did not put law enforcement in an entirely positive light. E.g., A LBERT J. REISS, JR., THE
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971). That study grew out of a project that Reiss did for a presidential
commission. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) (commonly known as the Katzenbach Commission). His findings relating to
bad police behavior generated controversy because he was unwilling to release his supporting data or
identify the officers who behaved badly. See David Burnham, 5,360 Meetings Between 579 Policemen
and 11,255 Citizens, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/11/28/archives/thepolice-and-the-public-by-albert-j-reiss-jr-228-pp-new-haven.html.
108 See Hardaway, supra note 16, at 169–71; Roger Fradin, Collective Bargaining in the Police and
Firefighter Services, in UNIONIZING THE ARMED FORCES 103, 103 (Ezra S. Krendel & Bernard L. Samoff
eds., 1977) (regarding the lack of progress in police unionization between 1919 and the 1960s).
109 See Fradin, supra note 108, at 112.
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elected officials.110 These efforts were also perceived as counter to the duty
assumed by public servants.111 During this time, police associations
unsuccessfully sought to establish connections with national labor
organizations to advance their goal of securing collective bargaining
rights.112 Even the national Fraternal Order of Police took an anti-union
stance; its leader preferred instead to promote professionalism akin to
academics, lawyers, and doctors.113 More than forty years passed in the
United States without codified union rights for police associations.114
Despite the lull, police unionization efforts netted significant gains
during the 1960s. On a national level, the Fraternal Order of Police had
eighty thousand members and was connected to 733 local lodges by 1969.115
Though FOP membership did not confer local collective bargaining rights,
significant progress in that realm was also made during the sixties. Law
enforcement associations were not without any means of advocating for their
members despite not having the statutory right to negotiate with public
employers. As discussed above, association leaders lobbied public officials
to secure pension and health insurance benefits.116 But no law enforcement
agency had statutory collective bargaining rights before the 1960s.117 By the
beginning of the next decade, fourteen states enacted such statutes.118 It is
important to recognize that collective bargaining rights for public sector
employees also gained ground during the 1960s.119 But the momentum for
that was in motion decades earlier.120 The sharp about-face regarding police
unionization abruptly dispensed with previously long-held concerns
regarding the public service duty of sworn personnel.121 The table below
identifies the states that enacted mandatory collective bargaining statutes
during the 1960s. It does not include those local or state jurisdictions that
allowed officers to join police associations but did not require the employer
to negotiate contract terms with them.

110 See JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND
STATE, 1900–1962, at 29 (2004); RICHARD C. KEARNEY & PATRICE M. MARESCHAL, LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 239–40 (CRC Press, 5th ed. 2014).
111 SLATER, supra note 110, at 27 (quoting The Boston Police Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1919,
at 10, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1919/09/10/118157632.pdf (“A policeman has
no more right to belong to a union than a soldier or a sailor.”)).
112 Id. at 35–36.
113 William J. Bopp, The Police Rebellion, in THE POLICE REBELLION : A QUEST FOR BLUE POWER,
supra note 84, at 5, 16.
114 JOHN BURPO, THE POLICE LABOR MOVEMENT : PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 6 (1971).
115 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 28.
116 BURPO, supra note 114, at 81.
117 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 12.
118 See infra tbl.1.
119 See SLATER, supra note 110, at 71–72.
120 Id. at 16.
121 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1: STATES WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS
INCLUDING POLICE FROM 1960–1969 122
STATE

YEAR

AUTHORITY

California

1969

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3500

Connecticut123

1965

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-467

Delaware124

1965

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1301

1965

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 178G–N

Michigan

1965

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.215

Minnesota126

1965

MINN. STAT. § 179.50

New Jersey

1968

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3

New York127

1967

N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 204(2)

Oregon128

1963

OR. REV. STAT. § 243.710

Pennsylvania

1968

43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 217.1

Rhode Island

1963

28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.2-2

Vermont

1969

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 901

Washington

1969

WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.040

Wisconsin

1961

WIS. STAT. § 111.70

Massachusetts

125

122 See generally BURPO , supra note 114, at 39–60 (examining all state laws related to employee
collective bargaining rights as of 1971).
123 The current authority is CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-271.
124 The current authority is DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1601–1623.
125 Evolution of Public Employee Collective Bargaining, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/infodetails/evolution-of-public-employee-collective-bargaining (last visited Nov. 13, 2022). The current
authority is MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, §§ 1–15.
126 The current authority is MINN. STAT. § 179A.06.
127 There are some who contend that police officers in New York City gained the right to
collectively bargain with municipal government in 1958 under what is commonly referred to as “The
Little Wagner Act.” See Anthony C. Russo, Management’s View of the New York City Experience, 30
PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI . 81, 82 (1970). Mayor Robert F. Wagner (the son of Sen. Robert Wagner,
namesake of the federal Wagner Act) signed Executive Order 49, also known as “The Little Wagner
Act,” on March 31, 1958. Id. But that appears to be inaccurate based on statements made by Mayor
Wagner and those familiar with his administration regarding the intent of the legislation and the political
calculus made regarding excluding law enforcement from the Little Wagner Act, specifically as it related
to police officers. See LEVI, supra note 102, at 25–27. The PBA became what Levi referred to as a de
facto union on March 29, 1963, when Mayor Wagner signed an “Executive Order on the Conduct of
Labor Relations Between the City of New York and Members of the Police Force of the Police
Department.” Id. at 54–55. It gave NYPD officers collective bargaining rights. Id.
128 OR. STATE LEGISLATURE , BACKGROUND BRIEF ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 2 (2012),
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/lpro/Publications/CollectiveBargaining.pdf. The current authority is
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.650.
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Fourteen states passed legislation requiring government employers to
negotiate employment terms with law enforcement during the 1960s.129
Twelve of the fourteen statutes were passed during the latter half of the
decade, from 1965 to 1969.130 In 1965 alone, five states granted police
officers collective bargaining rights.131 Police associations developed both a
national and local network that included tens of thousands of officers. At
least 65,250 officers were members of organizations in states with collective
bargaining statutes for police that negotiated or lobbied contract terms with
their employer by 1970.132 There were at least another 6,400 officers
associated with police organizations who continued to lobby for contract
terms despite not having collective bargaining rights.133 Significantly, law
enforcement salaries increased by thirty-eight percent in just a five-year
period—from 1964 to 1969—as collective bargaining rights expanded
across the country.134
A study of collective bargaining agreements by the United States
Department of Labor provides no indication that early union contracts did
anything to address problems of racism and brutality within police
departments. 135 The report detailed provisions of 292 collective bargaining
agreements from 1972 to 1973 that were specific to police and sheriff
departments. 136 Of the 292, approximately forty-four percent of the
contracts contained disciplinary provisions. 137 Around fifty-four percent of
them contained provisions regarding review boards. 138 Of those few
agreements providing for review boards, most defined membership as
comprising only police departments, with one provision explicitly
excluding the public.139 Others provided for participation from the mayor
or city manager, 140 But community participation or membership was not
mentioned in any of the contracts surveyed. 141 One contract contained a
129

See supra tbl.1.
See supra tbl.1.
131 See supra tbl.1.
132 JURIS & FEUILLE , supra note 82, at 34–36 tbl.2-1 (showing the number of officers associated
with police unions in the jurisdictions surveyed, which also includes officers in Dayton and Cincinnati,
Ohio who reportedly engaged management from a bargaining status but did not have collective
bargaining rights conferred via state law).
133 Id. at 34 tbl.2-1.
134 BURPO, supra note 114, at 11. Pay for officers in New York City began to increase in the mid1950s. After experiencing increases of 16.8% from 1953 to 1957 and of 14.3% from 1957 to 1961, New
York City officers received a 32.3% increase in the salary compensation from 1961 to 1965. See LEVI,
supra note 102, at 56.
135 See generally BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BULL. NO. 1885, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS FOR POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS (1976).
136 Id. at 2, 4.
137 Id. at 89.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 86.
140 Id.
141 See id.
130
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provision concerning public complaints and hearing processes. 142 The
disciplinary provisions reportedly covered misconduct related to
dishonesty, drunkenness, recklessness, and endangering others. 143 Two
contracts were noted for highlighting the need for officers to maintain
public trust, with one contract specifically stating that officers must “be
above reproach . . . on and off duty.”144
By the mid-to-late 1960s, the official collective bargaining rights of
police organizations increased rapidly and in unprecedented ways. The
significant impact of the sociopolitical climate of the 1960s on police
organizations’ efforts to secure collective bargaining rights is aptly
recognized. Yet, Juris and Feuille present a sanitized rationale for increased
law enforcement militancy that they describe as “a logical outcome of
increased police dissatisfaction.”145 They identified four factors as the source
of officer dissatisfaction: “increased public hostility, law-and-order
demands on the police, low pay, and poor personnel practices.”146 They also
listed three factors that led to the police’s willingness to use “confrontation
tactics”: “the demonstration effect of other public-employee successes, the
influx of young policemen, and group cohesion.”147 None of these factors
consider that the history of racial violence and subjugation enforced by and
within law enforcement served as a key factor in increased police militancy.
The reference to law-and-order demands being placed upon the police
suggests that the animating culture within departments was distinct from a
law-and-order philosophy. There is frankly no support for that premise.148
Police unions and their members loudly supported aggressive tactics against
Black liberation activists and other protesters.149 But the support extended
142

Id. at 85.
Id. at 84.
144 Id. at 84–85.
145 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 26.
146 Id. at 19.
147 Id.
148 This was true even prior to the 1960s, despite well-documented concerns of internal police
corruption connected to organized crime groups, illegal gambling, and other criminal activity. See, e.g.,
NAT’L COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1931) (presenting the results of a presidential commission, known as the Wickersham
Report, detailing the early 1900s police corruption in major cities involving bribery, coercion, and false
evidence); KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 49 (2010) (referring to the Lexow Commission of 1894 as the
“first blue-ribbon investigation of police corruption and violence in American history”); id. at 194
(describing the political strategy of Mayor Rudolph Blankenberg in Philadelphia to “attack[] police
corruption so that crooked politicians would no longer be able to pay for police protection”); id. at 223–24
(citing a March 1918 interview of Philadelphia’s Public Safety Director where he acknowledged
Philadelphia police officers were criminals—including murderers and robbers—and, therefore, unable to
combat crime in that city).
149 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 18–19 (describing how those who targeted and denounced
the Black Panther Party, Students for a Democratic Society, and others garnered the “loudest ovations”
at police association gatherings).
143
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beyond the union halls and police headquarters. The successful political
careers of Charles Stenvig in Minneapolis and Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia
(among others) are strong indications of a more symbiotic relationship
between police union interests and the larger community.150 This
relationship was, at least in some ways, a consequence of aligned common
interests focused on suppressing racial equality.
The previous section detailed the timing of that progress. Part II details
how police unions in Philadelphia, Rochester, and New York City employed
legal maneuvers and anti-Black rhetoric to gain popular and political support
as they sought to suppress Black liberation demands for an end to police
brutality. It describes the early police union pushback in those cities against
Black liberation efforts, civilian oversight, and other efforts to prevent police
brutality and increase law enforcement legitimacy.
II. GAINING POLITICAL POWER
For more than fifty years, police unions were considered to be
“dangerous and destructive.”151 That changed drastically in demonstrable
ways in the course of a few years. Police associations in fourteen northern
and western states transitioned from social clubs to recognized organizations
with significant interface with management.152 That interface involved either
lobbying or negotiating with government officials on issues related to wages,
hours, and other work conditions.153 Elected and appointed officials in many
states, as detailed above, were newly required to confer with union
representatives regarding the needs, interests, and demands of officers. It
quickly became apparent that the new power dynamic was not one of equal
standing. The following section identifies key instances when police unions
in New York City; Rochester, New York; and Philadelphia attacked modest
attempts by local governments to increase police accountability to the Black
communities. As detailed below, police unions successfully defeated
external oversight during the 1960s while simultaneously gaining popular
and political support that helped secure collective bargaining rights.

150

See infra text accompanying notes 384–98.
SLATER, supra note 110, at 14.
152 See supra Section I.B, tbl.1.
153 Judicial opinions have long interpreted this to not mean all topics related to employment. The
concept of managerial prerogative originated in private sector labor law disputes. It remains relevant in
public-sector labor law with many statutes specifically excluding managerial decision-making from
collective bargaining between public employees and employers. Policy determinations around use of
force and discipline have been designated as solely within the managerial prerogative of local
governments. See, e.g., Cassese v. Lindsay, 272 N.Y.S.2d 324, 331–32 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Berkeley Police
Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 143 Cal. Rptr. 255, 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
151
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A. Early Wins Against Oversight
Law enforcement officials have generally rejected efforts to grant
community members investigative authority into allegations of police
misconduct.154 The panoply of objections to non-sworn community
members investigating police officers range from assertions that police
brutality is not a systemic issue requiring external oversight, to denigrating
oversight supporters as communists or outside agitators, to assertions that
only police officers are competent to evaluate the conduct of other
officers.155 At least eight police unions in American cities launched efforts
to defeat community oversight processes during the 1960s.156 Such
processes, though now recognized as essential components of police
accountability, were roundly rejected by police unions as radically
dangerous for officers at the time.157 The following subsections detail three
aggressive judicial and public campaigns against community oversight by
police unions in racially diverse cities during the 1960s.
1. Philadelphia’s Fraternal Order of Police
Philadelphia became home to an influx of Black migrants during the
first half of the twentieth century. Black Americans moved to Philadelphia,
as they did to Chicago, Detroit, and New York, in search of better
employment opportunities and refuge from the terrors of the south. 158 The
city reached its highest population numbers in 1950, when it was reportedly
the third-largest city in the United States. 159 By 1960, Philadelphia was, by
far, home to more Black residents than anywhere else in the state. 160 The
arrival of Black Americans in northern cities during the first half of the
century brought with it racial tension that was not entirely unlike the Jim
Crow south they had fled. 161

154 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 17; JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82; BURPO,
supra note 114.
155 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 17, at 28.
156 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 155–56 (identifying New York, Philadelphia, Rochester,
Boston, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Seattle as cities where police unions sought to defeat civilian
review entities, as well as a 1970 challenge in Baltimore).
157 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 17, at 6.
158 “Between 1916 and 1919, approximately one-half million [B]lack southerners moved to northern
cities, and twice as many followed during the 1920’s.” James R. Grossman, The White Man’s Union:
The Great Migration and the Resonance of Race and Class in Chicago, 1916–1922, in THE GREAT
MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 83, 85 (Joe William Trotter, Jr., ed., 1991).
159
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Population History 1840–2021, BIGGESTUSCITIES.COM,
https://www.biggestuscities.com/city/philadelphia-pennsylvania (last visited Aug. 14, 2022).
160 George A. Schnell, The Changing Distribution of Pennsylvania’s Black Population—1960 to
1970, 47 PROC. PA. ACAD. SCI. 35, 35 (1973) (finding sixty-two percent of Black residents in
Pennsylvania in 1960 lived in Philadelphia).
161 Stephen A. Berrey, Obstacles to Freedom Life in Jim Crow America, in UNDERSTANDING AND
TEACHING THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 37, at 59, 67.
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The struggle for Black equality was firmly established in Philadelphia.
In the early 1940s, organizers there worked to bring attention to racial
segregation that left Black people to live in dilapidated and subpar housing
stock.162 Black Philadelphians were forced to send their children to
segregated public schools. In 1946, white Philadelphians prevented efforts
to desegregate the schools by physically blocking the doors and marking the
school property as Ku Klux Klan territory.163 Black movement leaders
organized “selective patronage” boycotts in 1960 to convince employers
who discriminated against Black applicants to provide equal employment
opportunities.164 This strategy was designed to promptly impact employers
who discriminated against Black workers through targeted economic
boycotts. Unlike the city’s Commission on Human Relations, from which
the NAACP had requested intervention on this issue more than three years
earlier,165 the targeted boycotts needed only six months to successfully
negotiate settlements with at least five major employers. 166 Black leaders
made similar demands on the city government regarding the absence of
Black workers involved in construction projects.167
The virtually all-white police department was widely described by Black
community members as “brutal.”168 This description is supported by research
conducted during the early 1950s that found “police believe that certain
groups of persons [Black and Puerto Rican] will respond only to fear and
rough treatment.”169 Reports surfaced of non-white Philadelphians on the
receiving end of such racist police practices. Officers reportedly used brutal
and discriminatory practices leading to improper arrests.170 Community
leaders, though aware of numerous civilian complaints against officers, were
unaware of any officer ever being disciplined as a result of those

162 James Wolfinger, “We Are in the Front Lines in the Battle for Democracy”: Carolyn Moore
and Black Activism in World War II Philadelphia, 72 PA. HIST. 1, 3, 6, 16 (2005).
163 Id. at 3.
164 MATTHEW J. COUNTRYMAN , UP SOUTH: CIVIL RIGHTS AND BLACK POWER IN PHILADELPHIA
101–03 (2006) (discussing the activities of the organization 400 Ministers to leverage Black economic
power as done in other northern cities during the 1930s and 1940s).
165 Id. at 102.
166 Id. at 104–06 (detailing how and when 400 Ministers successfully negotiated plans to resolve
discriminatory employment practices at General Baking, Tastykake, and bottlers for Pepsi-Cola, 7 Up,
and Coca-Cola).
167 Id. at 132–35 (describing the ebb and flow of progress in securing employment opportunities for
Black skilled workers on public construction projects).
168 Wolfinger, supra note 162, at 3.
169 William A. Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. SOCIO. 34, 40 (1953); THOMAS F.
PETTIGREW, A PROFILE OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN 152–53 (1964).
170 2 JOSEPH D. LOHMAN & GORDON E. MISNER, POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY : THE DYNAMICS
OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 213 (1966) (detailing what precipitated the formation
of the Philadelphia Police Review Board in 1958).
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complaints.171 It was in the face of that stark reality that civil rights leaders
advocated for civilian oversight of the Philadelphia Police Department.172
The Philadelphia Police Review Board was created by executive order
on October 1, 1958.173 Mayor J. Richardson Dilworth had been unable to
gain support among city council members for external police oversight.174
The Police Review Board was authorized to evaluate external complaints of
police brutality, false arrest, and discrimination.175 The board faced
challenges from the start. The first challenges were internal: Mayor Dilworth
appointed five community members to the board but failed to give them
operating guidelines, a budget, office space, or staff support.176 Many
community members were reportedly unaware of its existence, much less its
role during the board’s early years.177 Of those who were aware, white

171 Id. (detailing what precipitated the formation of the Philadelphia Police Review Board in 1958).
WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 17, at 23 (recounting the assertion by the Greater
Philadelphia Branch of the ACLU that in the sixteen years prior to the Police Advisory Board creation,
no officer was disciplined in proceedings involving a civilian complaint).
172 James R. Hudson, The Civilian Review Board Issue as Illuminated by the Philadelphia
Experience, 6 CRIMINOLOGICA 16, 18 (1968) [hereinafter Hudson, Civilian Review Board] (discussing
testimony offered by the ACLU and NAACP before Philadelphia City Council’s Committee on Law and
Government); Richard J. Terrill, Police Accountability in Philadelphia: Retrospects and Prospects, 7
AM. J. POLICE 79, 81–82 (1988) (identifying the ACLU as the organization advocating for the creation
of the Police Review Board in Philadelphia, and identifying that “[o]nly the ACLU, NAACP and a
segment of the [B]lack community . . . favored [the board’s] creation”); 2 LOHMAN & MISNER, supra
note 170, at 214 (discussing how the ACLU became convinced that other approaches to addressing
civilian complaints against officers for misconduct were unsuccessful).
It is important to note that NAACP support for Philadelphia’s civilian oversight mechanism
diminished greatly over the years. The organization reportedly joined the ACLU during the 1950s in
getting elected city officials to consider the implementation of a civilian review board. That support
dissipated as changes to the board’s authority and its outcomes revealed the limited impact it had on the
ongoing problem of police brutality experienced in Black communities. See 2 LOHMAN & MISNER, supra
note 170, at 250 tbl.19 (detailing complainants’ race and gender demographics for all complaints received
by the Police Advisory Board). Instead, the process was viewed as a failed attempt to placate the Black
community that continued to bear unjust and harsh treatment at the hands of police. This position earned
the NAACP and others decrying the ineffectiveness of the board as “militant civil rights organizations”
in search of “radical reforms” that the board was not responsible to deliver. Id.
173 Hudson, Civilian Review Board, supra note 172, at 18; Terrill, supra note 172, at 82;
RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 44.
174 Terrill, supra note 172, at 82. Corruption was also widely known to be a problem within the
Philadelphia Police Department. Details of police acting in their official capacity at the request of local
political leaders and openly taking bribes led new city leaders to attempt to reform government practices.
See James Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515,
525 (1971). Richardson Dilworth served as district attorney before becoming mayor and had received
complaints from community members that at least one officer in the department, Frank Rizzo, had ties
to the mob in South Philadelphia. See S.A. PAOLANTONIO, FRANK RIZZO: THE LAST BIG MAN IN BIG
CITY AMERICA 55 (1993).
175 Terrill, supra note 172, at 82.
176 Id. at 83; Hudson, Civilian Review Board, supra note 172, at 18.
177 Terrill, supra note 172, at 82.
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Philadelphians largely subscribed to law-and-order rhetoric and did not want
to see their police department “handcuff[ed].”178
Philadelphia’s Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) filed three court
challenges against the creation of the Police Review Board. The challenges
sought to enjoin board functions based on the argument that it violated the
city charter. 179 The first case, filed in 1959, ended with an out-of-court
settlement that resulted in clearer articulation of the board’s processes and
a name change. 180 The newly operationalized Police Advisory Board
received community member complaints about their interactions with
Philadelphia police. The board received 499 complaints from 1960 through
1965.181 Sixty-three percent of the complaints from 1960 to 1966 were filed
by those whom data collectors categorized as non-white.182 People
identified as non-white filed more than twice the number of brutality
complaints than white complainants. 183 The highest number of complaints,
114, was filed with the board in 1964, 184 the same year as a major uprising
in Philadelphia. 185 A newspaper story included comments from J. Edgar
Hoover, director of the FBI, which decried the board’s existence with
claims that it “emboldened” people to defy police orders and that the police
were paralyzed.186
The next two legal challenges by the FOP were filed during the next two
years. The FOP lawsuit filed in September 1965 accused the Police Advisory
Board of violating the city charter, improperly conducting judicial reviews
instead of serving as an advisory board, and preventing officers from
178

Id.
Hudson, Civilian Review Board, supra note 172, at 18–19.
180 Id. at 19.
181 Id. at 23 tbl.4 (detailing the number of complaints received by the Police Advisory Board during
its years of operation with the categories of case types, raw number of complaints, and percentage of case
type in comparison to the overall number of cases).
182 2 LOHMAN & MISNER, supra note 170, at 250 tbl.19 (detailing complainants’ race and gender
demographics for all complaints received by the Police Advisory Board).
183 Hudson, Civilian Review Board, supra note 172, at 24 tbl.5 (This table identifies the racial
categories of complainants as “white,” “non-white,” and “unknown.” White complainants filed sixty-two
complaints that police were brutal during interaction with the public, while “non-white” complainants
filed 129 of the same type of complaints).
184 Id. at 23.
185 North Philadelphia experienced nearly three days of public unrest—including looting of
white-owned businesses, rock- and bottle-throwing at police officers, and breaking out windows of police
cars—that began during the late hours of August 28, 1964. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 164, at 155–59.
This was one of eight uprisings during 1964. KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 89, at 19–20. The unrest
in Philadelphia began following officers’ attempt to arrest a couple arguing in a car found broken down
in the street. False information regarding the incident spread and led members of the economically
impoverished neighborhood to believe that officers had attacked and killed a pregnant Black woman.
Police responded to the looting and rock- and bottle-throwing with guns, firehoses, rooftop snipers, and
dogs. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 164, at 155–59. North Philadelphia was an exclusively Black
neighborhood where its residents experienced “grinding poverty.” Id. at 158. They earned 30 percent less
than the average city worker but endured inflated costs for unsafe housing. Id.
186 FBI Disputed Here on Review Board, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 29, 1964, at 26.
179
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performing their duties.187 It resulted in a temporary restraining order that
suspended the board’s activity for five months.188
The union then filed a third lawsuit against the city seeking to abolish
external community oversight in Philadelphia. Judge Leo Weinrott agreed
with the union in his March 1967 opinion.189 The court found that the board
improperly served as a judicial tribunal, served to harass officers, and
produced anxiety that “must inevitably lessen the effectiveness of police
performance.”190 Weinrott’s comments to the press following his fifty-twopage opinion demonstrated his inflated view of the role and authority of
police. He analogized Philadelphia’s municipal police department with
military forces, reasoning that “nobody would ever think, would they, of
having civilians discipline members of the armed forces? This is really an
army. There is no question about that.”191 Weinrott’s comments also
revealed that he found a television survey on the matter to be particularly
persuasive, noting that the “television station, whichever one it is that runs
those viewer surveys, had one last night about the board. And 80 percent of
the people voted in favor of abolishment.”192
Judge Weinrott was not the only one persuaded by the pro-police
sentiment driven by the FOP attack against community-based oversight. The
election of James H. J. Tate as Mayor Dilworth’s successor brought with it
a change in the city government’s view of the Police Advisory Board. As
discussed in greater detail below, Tate recognized the political expediency
of being aligned with Police Commissioner Frank Rizzo. Mayor Tate waited
nineteen months to pursue an appeal of Judge Weinrott’s decision.193 In the
interim, Pennsylvanian police personnel gained the right to collectively
bargain under state law on June 24, 1968.194 This series of events illustrates
Samuel Walker’s point that “[t]he demand for external oversight galvanized
rank-and-file officers and spurred the creation of local police unions.”195
Though the FOP had the political support of local election officials,
courts in Rochester and New York City had approved the legality of external
community oversight during the time that passed since the Philadelphia FOP
filed its last two challenges.196 In June 1969, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the creation of the board by executive order.197 It also found
187

See RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 45; COUNTRYMAN supra note 164, at 283.
RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 45.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Joe McGinniss, The Sad Death of a Police Board, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 31, 1967, at 31.
192 Id.
193 RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 45.
194 Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act, 1968 Pa. Laws 237 (codified at 43 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 217.1–.10 (1968)).
195 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 17, at 27 (emphasis added).
196 Id.
197 Harrington v. Tate, 254 A.2d 622, 624 (Pa. 1969).
188
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that its recommendations to the police commissioner were advisory in nature
and, therefore, not an illegal judicial proceeding.198 Citing judicial opinions
regarding external oversight in Rochester and New York City, the court
placed significant weight on the fact that the board made recommendations
that the police commissioner was free to accept or disregard. 199 But the
PAB’s ultimate judicial victory was of little consequence to the new city
administration. Mayor Tate, closely aligning himself with Police
Commissioner Rizzo, unequivocally announced, “Commissioner Rizzo does
not want . . . [the PAB], and if Commissioner Rizzo does not want it, I do
not want it.”200
2. Rochester and the Locust Club
Like Philadelphia, the Black population in Rochester, New York,
increased significantly between 1950 and 1960. 201 Racial discrimination
against Black residents was prevalent in all segments of society—
employment, education, and housing. 202 A local newspaper investigative
report exposed the prevalence of housing discrimination. The report
compared the experiences of a Black journalist and his white colleague as
they responded to apartment advertisements.203 Every rental agent denied
having an available unit immediately upon seeing the Black journalist
posing as a potential renter. His white colleague was befuddled at their
starkly different experiences. After all, he’d been welcomed in to view
every advertised unit.204 The newspaper’s investigative report called
attention to housing discrimination long experienced by Black people in
Rochester. 205 Regardless of income, Black people were restricted to two
areas of the city. And the quality of the housing stock was dreadful. 206 The
push for suitable housing caused Black leaders to abandon the traditional
incremental approach to racial progress previously employed by Black
NAACP leadership. 207 Black activists, often referred to as the Young Turks,
were recognized as being distinctly different from the “old Negro docility”
198

Id. at 179.
Id.
200 Eric C. Schneider, et al., Dirty Work: Police and Community Relations and the Limits of
Liberalism in Postwar Philadelphia, 14 J. URB. HIST. 961, 972 (2017).
201 LAURA WARREN HILL, STRIKE THE HAMMER: THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN ROCHESTER,
NEW YORK, 1940–1970, at 13 (2021) (noting that nearly 16,000 Black people migrated to Rochester
during this time, increasing the percentage of Black population from 2.3% to 7.4%).
202 Id. at 11–12. Robert F. Williams (see supra note 59) arrived in Rochester from North Carolina
looking for employment at Eastman Kodak only to find out, after an exhaustive search that expanded
weeks, that the only work available for a Black man who served in the war was in agricultural fields
picking fruits and vegetables. He returned to North Carolina. Id.
203 Id. at 19.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 17–18.
207 Id. at 37.
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to which the community and its police force had been accustomed.208
Rochester residents experiencing racial discrimination regardless of their
economic status coalesced and organized together because they were
“Black folks first.”209
The white power structure in Rochester was adamant about maintaining
its racially segregated housing and education spaces. 210 And those white
residents unable to flee to the suburbs complained about the influx of Black
people to law enforcement.211 Police responded with acts of intimidation,
harassment, and brutal force against Black residents across age, religion,
and socioeconomic status. 212 Intimidation tactics included the use of police
dog units to exclusively patrol recreation areas frequented by Black
teenagers. 213 In August 1962, police broke the back of a well-respected
Black gas station attendant in uniform after questioning what he was doing
with a key to the business and referring to him with a racial epithet.214
Rochester police entered Nation of Islam headquarters from a supposed
anonymous tip about “a man with a gun” in January 1963.215 The
warrantless entry resulted in the immediate arrest of two men and the later
indictment of another seventeen men associated with the Nation of Islam. 216
A short time later, police repeatedly beat an intoxicated man enjoying block
party festivities as he moved a car from one side of the street to the other.217
The concerns about police abuses raised by Black community leaders since

208

Id.
Id. at 33 (quoting Mildred Johnson, a community leader speaking at a local convening of six to
eight hundred Black community members in February 1963). This gathering, known as the Baden Street
rally, included an interreligious group of non-Muslim and Muslim community members gathered to
speak out against “several recent cases of police brutality.” Id. Malcolm X, a leader of the Nation of
Islam (NOI) at the time, was present because of police violence endured by NOI members in the city. He
would make frequent visits to the city to denounce police violence. Id. at 33, 35. His last visit was just
five days before his assassination. Id. at 44–45.
210 This became increasingly apparent to Black community members because of the nominal and
limited integration progress made through the efforts of white NAACP members who would serve as
straw buyers of homes in white neighborhoods for Black homeowners. Black residents in need of better
public housing were dismayed by the city council’s refusal to explore using federal funds to build new
public housing throughout the city instead of simply adjacent to existing, dilapidated public housing. The
council reasoned that doing so would prevent white resistance. Id. at 25–26.
211 Id. at 36; see also Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 650, 717 (2020)
(detailing how police are responsible for defining and maintaining racial segregation in urban areas).
212 HILL, supra note 201, at 37.
213 Id. at 38.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 38–39.
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1961218 culminated in February 1963 with demands for external oversight
of the Rochester police.219
Insulating law enforcement from external oversight quickly became a
priority for Rochester’s Locust Club police union. In 1963, it began what
evolved into a three-pronged, multiyear attack against community
oversight.220 The first prong, launched in early March 1963, involved
lobbying local elected officials.221 The union presented a letter to City
Council detailing its opposition to a citizens’ police advisory committee. The
letter enumerated several reasons the union opposed community oversight,
including the inability of “laymen” to understand the “problems of
policemen,” the negative impact on officer morale, and that such a
committee would undermine public confidence in Rochester police.222
The second prong, activated also in March 1963, involved garnering
public support. The union was buoyed by support from individuals and
associations outside of its members as a part of its lobbying effort. 223 A
circulated petition reportedly netted 40,000 signatures against the creation
of an oversight board.224 The signatures represented those “oppos[ed to] the
creation of a Police Advisory Board.”225 It is unclear if all of the signatories
were Rochester residents.226 The Locust Club boasted the support of those
outside of the city. News reports during that time told of the union’s ability
to garner support from the 50,000-member Police Conference of New York
and a “nation-wide federation of law enforcement officers” in its efforts to
block the board.227

218 A coalition of organizations united against police terror included the Young Turks, NAACP,
Human Relations Commission, and Rochester Area Council of Churches.
219 A full-page newspaper advertisement called for a police review board. The ad was placed by a
group of local clergies in Rochester in the days after the Baden Street rally (see supra note 209). Id. at 49.
220 T. Forsyth, A Brief History of the Police Advisory Board from 1963–1970, ROCHESTER
INDYMEDIA (June 6, 2015, 8:03 AM), http://rochester.indymedia.org/node/146932.
221 Id.
222 Letter from Daniel J. Murphy, President, The Locust Club, to Rochester City Council (Mar. 11,
1963), http://rochester.indymedia.org/sites/default/files/PABresponses.PDF, at 9–10.
223 Letter from Raymond J. Martin, Recording Secretary, Rochester Firemen’s Benevolent
Association, to Rochester City Council (Mar. 6, 1963), http://rochester.indymedia.org/sites/default/
files/PABresponses.PDF, at 8; Letter from E. James Geater, Chairman, Conservative Party of Monroe
County, to Rochester City Council (Mar. 26, 1963), http://rochester.indymedia.org/sites/default/files/
Conservative%20party%20foil.PDF.
224 Vince Spezzano, Police Petitions Against Board Get 40,000 Names, ROCHESTER TIMES-UNION,
Mar. 12, 1963.
225 Id.
226 Letters in support of the Police Advisory Board were also sent to the mayor and city council,
available at http://rochester.indymedia.org/sites/default/files/PABresponses.PDF, at 1–5.
227 Forsyth, supra note 220 (quoting Lawmen Pledge Funds to Fight Advisory Board, DEMOCRAT
& CHRON., May 18, 1965, at B1).
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The political lobbying and public opposition to external police oversight
did not deter local elected officials.228 Rochester City Council, in reaction to
Black liberation demands, proceeded with plans to establish the Police
Advisory Board (PAB). It passed legislation to do so on March 26, 1963.229
The Board formalized its internal structures, investigated, and made
recommendations regarding allegations of excessive force to the chief of
police.230 The newly enacted city charter also authorized the board to report
any disagreement between their findings and the chief to Rochester’s
commissioner of public safety and city manager.231
Support for the police union’s anti-accountability stance was not limited
to law enforcement. Community members in Rochester supported the Locust
Club’s efforts and formed the Citizens for Abolition of the Police Advisory
Board in March 1965.232 The initial group had about twenty members. It was
led by local steel labor leaders and a noted Conservative Party political
candidate and included a reverend, physician, and a college professor on its
executive board.233 The Coalition openly espoused J. Edgar Hoover’s
position “that police advisory boards are detrimental to law and order.”234
The Locust Club escalated its opposition to the board with its final prong
of the attack via litigation.235 The union’s Complaint, filed on April 14, 1965,
sought injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against the City of
Rochester for creating a community-based external oversight board.236 The
work of the PAB came to an abrupt halt the next day. On April 15, a trial
court judge granted a temporary restraining order that enjoined the board
from conducting any investigation, holding hearings, or performing any
other official acts.237 In December, the trial court included three points in its
declaratory judgment. First, it presumed that only the police commissioner
228 The view exists that the decision by Rochester City Council to provide for community oversight
of the police was not simply because they fully agreed with the Black liberation leaders. Instead, Hill’s
account in Strike the Hammer discusses how the city council’s resolve to create the Police Advisory
Board was a calculated decision aimed at appeasing the more moderate civil rights leaders on the Human
Relations Committee of Monroe County and driving a wedge between the more insistent activists, like
Malcolm X. HILL, supra note 201, at 49.
229 Judicial Statement at 7, Locust Club of Rochester v. City of Rochester, No. 799, 1968 WL
112483 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1968). The timing of the legislation is important and speaks to both the
responsiveness of Rochester City Council and the strong opposition from the union and conservatives.
Malcolm X and five hundred demonstrators protested the Rochester Police Department’s treatment of
Nation of Islam members, see supra note 209, one month prior to the legislation that enacted the Police
Advisory Board. RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 89.
230 Forsyth, supra note 220.
231 Locust Club of Rochester v. City of Rochester, 265 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
232 Forsyth, supra note 220.
233 Group Will Fight Advisory Board, DEMOCRAT & CHRON., March 27, 1965, at B1.
234 Id.
235 See Judicial Statement, supra note 229, at 3–4 (summarizing the history of litigation upon appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968).
236 Id.; Locust Club, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
237 Forsyth, supra note 220.
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had the requisite experience to evaluate the appropriate amount of force
necessary under exigent circumstances. 238 Second, it found that the rights of
subject officers were violated by allowing the board involvement to
“become intertwined” with the Department of Public Safety. 239 Finally, it
found that any public criticism of police officers by the board would
constitute an improper public reprimand.240
More than two years passed before an appellate court unanimously
reversed the trial court’s decision.241 The opinion articulated an appreciation
for the legislative intent of the ordinance that sought “to strike a balance
between the rights of the police officer and the rights of the citizen.”242
Citing New York Times v. Sullivan,243 the court was also not persuaded that
the principles of democracy permitted police officers to be shielded from
public criticism.244 Judicial vindication was of no practical consequence. A
new mayor was elected the year after the appellate court’s decision, and the
local press praised “the new Republican city administration” for
“commendably abolish[ing]” the Police Advisory Board.245
3. NYPD Police Benevolent Association
Police officers in New York City were subject to internal investigations
beginning in 1953.246 The entity known as the New York City Civilian
Complaint Review Board (CCRB) included three sworn officers. Those
officers reviewed allegations of misconduct against their colleagues.247 John
Lindsay was elected mayor in 1965.248 His election came the year after the
three deputy commissioners exonerated Thomas Gilligan, an off-duty
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Locust Club, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
Id. at 749.
240 Id.
241 Locust Club of Rochester v. City of Rochester, 286 N.Y.S.2d 99, 104 (App. Div. 1968).
242 Id.
243 376 U.S. 254, 299 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“In a democratic society, one who assumes
to act for the citizens . . . must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized.”).
244 Locust Club, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
245 Police Advisory Board Abolished, TIMES-UNION, May 15, 1970.
246 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY , supra note 17, at 29. Mayor Vincent Impellitterri
established the NYPD’s Civilian Complaint Review Board after a Congressional investigation revealed
that the U.S. Department of Justice under the Truman administration allegedly agreed to delay its
investigation of civil rights complaints against the NYPD. Specifically, the investigation showed the DOJ
was aware of allegations of police brutality and the NYPD’s failure to hold officers accountable for
sustained findings of misconduct. Despite this knowledge, the DOJ secretly agreed to not pursue its own
investigation provided NYPD create its own internal review board. Id. at 29. Congressional hearings into
the details of the secret agreement revealed that the NYPD’s Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association pushed
for the deal in order to avoid additional attention being directed at its officers, some of whom were already
under investigation in state proceedings. See Ronald Kahn, Urban Reform and Police Accountability in
New York City: 1950–74, in URBAN PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY, 107, 111 (Robert L. Lineberry &
Louis H. Masotti eds., 1975).
247 Bopp, supra note 113, at 10.
248 RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 39.
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lieutenant who shot and killed fifteen-year-old James Powell.249 In response
to the decision, the Congress on Racial Equality and other groups advocating
for an end to discrimination against Black people voiced demands for
civilian oversight of NYPD officers.250
The new mayor appointed Howard Leary, a former Philadelphia police
commissioner and champion of civilian review boards, as the NYPD’s new
commissioner.251 Together, they kept one of the mayor’s campaign promises
and, through the commissioner’s General Order No. 14, expanded the
NYPD’s internal investigation board of three sworn officers to include four
civilians.252 Mayor Lindsay also unequivocally announced that it was his
responsibility, as a democratically elected leader, to ensure that the “Police
Department [was not] a law unto itself.”253 The board had limited power to
only recommend whether the police department should proceed with its own
hearings and adjudication processes.254
Despite the limited purview of the board, the police union was vexed by
the erosion of its unchecked and insulated autonomy.255 The addition of
community members to the board was wholly unacceptable to union
leadership.256 Lobbying efforts with state legislatures failed and the New
York Police Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) launched an
aggressive and expensive ($500,000) campaign to return the board to its
original composition of sworn officers investigating allegations of police
misconduct.257 This new iteration defied the PBA’s goal of using the
police-only board to remove “the heat” from its officers already embroiled
in an investigation into gambling corruption.258 The campaign took the form
of a voter referendum promoted through a fear-inducing public campaign259
and a series of judicial challenges.260

249 Martin Arnold, Police Board Absolves Gilligan in Slaying of Negro Teen-Ager, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/11/07/archives/police-board-absolves-gilligan-inslayin-g-of-negro-teenager-no.html.
250 Id.
251 RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 40.
252 Cassese v. Lindsay, 272 N.Y.S.2d 324, 329 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (stating that the police commissioner
enacted General Order No. 14 on May 2, 1966); RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 39.
253 RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 40.
254 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 91.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 49; see also Ed Cray, The Politics of Blue Power, in THE POLICE REBELLION : A QUEST
FOR BLUE POWER, supra note 84, at 53, 56 (“PBA poured great sums of money into the campaign against
the board.”).
258 Kahn, supra note 246, at 111.
259 RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 85 (describing advertisements used by the PBA to scare
community members about the rise in violent crime that would occur and the safety of young girls if the
CCRB was allowed to exist).
260 William J. Bopp, The New York City Referendum on Civilian Review, in THE POLICE
REBELLION: A QUEST FOR BLUE POWER, supra note 84, at 119, 124–29.
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PBA president John Cassese was the lead plaintiff in a class-action
lawsuit against Mayor Lindsay and Commissioner Leary. 261 The suit sought
declaratory judgment and to permanently enjoin the City from
implementing Commissioner Leary’s iteration of the CCRB through his
General Order No. 14.262 Cassese and his co-plaintiffs pled that the order
was “illegal and invalid.”263 As the parties awaited a decision from the
court, Cassese began to drum up public support for a referendum, if
needed. 264 He diminished the concerns of “various minority groups” and
declared the board had “no need for civilians.” 265
Twenty days later, the court sided with the city.266 The opinion found that
the police commissioner had sole authority to enact General Order No. 14 and
that he was solely responsible for the disciplinary decisions.267 Although the
court acknowledged the purpose of increasing community faith in policing,
its opinion legitimized police union assertions that only sworn personnel
should have the authority to make policy and procedure decisions.268 The
court went on to distinguish the civilian review process in New York City
from the one in Rochester previously halted by judicial action.269 The
distinguishing factor was that the board in Rochester was created by an act
of city council rather than the commissioner of public safety.270 An appellate
court refused to consider a subsequent appeal by the PBA.271
The PBA was not deterred. Cassese declared that he was “sick and tired
of giving in to minority groups.”272 He also accused the mayor of going out
261

Cassese v. Lindsay, 272 N.Y.S.2d 324, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
Id. at 326.
263 Id. at 330. The Complaint specifically alleged that General Order No. 14 “‘(a) . . . invade[d] the
powers of the Police Commissioner of the City of New York to control the conduct and discipline of the
members of the Police Department; (b) . . . constitute[d] an illegal and invalid delegation of power to
civilians; (c) . . . constitute[d] an illegal and invalid assertion by the defendant Mayor of power belonging
to the defendant Police Commissioner; (d) . . . constitute[d] an illegal and invalid attempt by the
defendants to assert powers belonging to the legislature alone and not to administrative or executive
officers of government; the . . . subject[ed] members of the Police Department to the investigation,
examination and hearing of charges against them in a manner other than that prescribed by law; (f) . . .
deprive[d] members of the Police Department of due process of law; [and] (g) . . . violate[d] [s]ections
. . . of the New York City Charter, . . . Administrative Code of the City of New York, . . . Civil Service
Law of the State of New York, . . . Constitution of the State of New York, and the . . . United States
Constitution, as well as other applicable provisions of law.’” Id.
264 Eric Pace, P.B.A. Asks Public to Oppose Board, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1966, at 26,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1966/06/03/82445688.pdf.
265 Id.
266 Cassese, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
267 Id. at 334–35.
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269 See supra notes 229–34 and accompanying text.
270 Cassese, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
271 P.B.A. Bid to Block New Review Board Rejected by Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1966, at 90,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1966/06/28/82825394.pdf.
272 Bernard Weinraub, Racism Laid to P.B.A. Head in Review Board Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
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of his way to name the selected community members, which included two
Black people and one Puerto Rican.273 The union shifted its attention from
the courts and pursued a charter amendment. The amendment called for the
abolishment of Mayor Lindsay’s iteration of the CCRB and to require all
members of the review board to be appointed or administrative employees
of the NYPD.274 As a demonstration of public support, the PBA filed more
than 50,000 signatures seeking a ballot measure on the issue within two
weeks of the court’s decision.275 One journalist wrote that the referendum
was “considered by many a focus for the white backlash in the city.”276 The
union and its community backers placed an ad with the image of a young
white girl leaving a dark subway tunnel alone. The print accompanying the
illustration read, “The Civilian Review Board must be stopped! Her life . . .
your life . . . may depend on it . . . . [A police officer] must not hesitate.”277
Civil liberties organizations decried the union’s aggressive advertisement
and accused it of stoking the fears of lower-income white residents against
Black and Puerto Rican residents.278
For its part, the city defended the mayor’s managerial and executive
authority to create the board in both judicial courthouses and the court of
public opinion. The mayor utilized a press conference as one avenue of
reaching the public.279 Members of the local bar association joined him in a
public address to impress upon voters the extreme scope of the referendum.
In order to do so, city officials attempted to expand the issue beyond the
issue of racially motivated police brutality. Mayor Lindsay argued that the
city and the people of New York should understand the need to investigate
potential corruption within the department that created a culture where
officers do such things as buy promotions.280 A vote in favor of the
referendum, Lindsay said, would insulate NYPD officers from investigation
by any individual, body, or department under the direction of the mayor. In
short, the person elected by the people to represent them would not have any
authority to manage the city’s police force. 281 The voting public, however,
demonstrated strong support for keeping potential police misconduct
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TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 1966, at 36, 36, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1966/
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insulated from external reviews. New York City voters approved the
referendum by a two-to-one margin.282
B. Flexing Political Muscle
Police unions recognized that political favor was most likely to be found
outside of the courtroom. The judicial battle against civilian review boards
brought mixed results. Where local trial courts were willing to temporarily
enjoin external oversight, appellate courts denied unions the permanent
judicial relief they sought.283 But judicial relief was simply one portion of
the battle. Ultimate victory rested in the ability of police unions to exact
political power in at least three ways. Unions employed a strategy during the
1960s that involved pressuring elected and appointed officials to meet union
demands, garnering the support of the public through large demonstrations
and political campaigns, and ultimately using their political power to secure
the election of mayors aligned with the agenda of police unions. This
subsection highlights key union successes employing those three tactics to
circumvent accountability.
1. Pressure on Local Elected and Appointed Officials
Proponents of police accountability have identified a number of ways in
which police policies and practices impede efforts to create police
departments that are accountable to all segments of a community. Failure to
properly display officers’ names on uniforms is one such practice.284 The
Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association (PBA), despite having been regarded
as the primary exhibit against police unionization after the Boston police
strike of 1919,285 successfully used political power plays to impede
accountability when those impacted by police misconduct demanded
more.286 Upon gaining collective bargain bargaining rights in 1966, the PBA
282
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immediately began to challenge various attempts by the mayor to address
the concerns of the Black community and other civil liberty proponents.287
In 1969, student demonstrators at Harvard University reported that
Boston officers removed their name tags to hide their identity while violently
attacking the demonstrators.288 The mayor and police sought to resolve
officer assertions that the badge pins posed a danger to their safety by
arranging for name tags to be sewn on the uniforms.289 The union, still
dissatisfied, picketed the police headquarters and successfully prevented the
union tailor from crossing the picket line to sew on name tags.290 It then
employed two lines of attack: the first involved filing a grievance and the
second was legislation. Boston City Council adopted a measure that allowed
for officers to have numbers issued on their uniforms instead of names.291
The arbitrator’s eventual finding on behalf of the police commissioner was
of no consequence.292 Elected officials on the city council delivered a victory
to the union.
The PBA in New York City used political influence to circumvent
another initiative to enhance accountability. Police Commissioner Leary
believed that a more diverse police department could be instrumental in
improving its relationship with marginalized communities.293 His strategy
was responsive to concerns from civil rights leaders at the time that the white
racial homogeny of police departments was a key factor in the
disproportionate brutality and racism endured by diverse community
members.294 There was no question that the NYPD was racially homogenous
in the 1960s. A federal study in 1963 revealed that only 5% of NYPD
officers were Black; far less than the approximate 33%, 25%, and 20% of
Black officers in Baltimore, Chicago, and Philadelphia, respectively.295 The
NYPD PBA expressed strong opposition to efforts designed to expand
recruitment to Black and Puerto Rican youth. The initial opposition implied

ASSOCIATION, TECH. REP. NO. 11-75, at 43–44 (1975), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
25606NCJRS.pdf
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288 Id. at 44.
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a level of unfairness to white youth.296 It morphed into concerns that efforts
to remove minor criminal convictions as a bar to consideration for
employment as a police officer would negatively impact efforts to
professionalize law enforcement.297 The threat of “vigorous[] oppos[tion]”
from the PBA prompted the Civil Service Commission to quietly table its
support for the mayor and commissioner’s planned program.298
The Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association (BPPA) in Boston also used
its political power to destroy a mayoral initiative designed to diversify the
police force.299 Mayor Kevin White wanted to expand the existing cadet
program by hiring one hundred cadets to direct traffic in 1968.300 The
expansion would have allowed him to make good on a campaign promise to
increase the number of Black officers in Boston.301 Racial animus, couched
in arguments of competency, and a desire to hold on to the coveted
traffic-directing role were cited as the two reasons for BPPA opposition to
expanding the cadet program.302 The union successfully lobbied the city
council to reject an ordinance presented by White that would have expanded
the program.303 Union power also led the state legislature to rebuff White’s
attempt to garner support with that body for his initiative.304
2. Racism Within Police Unions
Union leaders and their members were known to position themselves as
strident opponents of civil rights and the Black Freedom movement. It would
be misguided to attribute that opposition to benign concerns about who
possessed the requisite technical skill to criticize the police and provide input
on policing practices. A six-week study of officers in Boston, Chicago, and
D.C. in 1966 revealed that seventy-two percent of officers voluntarily shared
racist viewpoints that conveyed an “intense and bitter hatred towards”
Blacks.305 A white journalist wrote about candid conversations he had with
NYPD officers in 1968 in which they shared details of their murderous
fantasies about Black people.306 And in testimony to the Kerner
296 Battler for Police Rights, John Joseph Cassese, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1966, at 28,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1966/05/09/82432843.pdf (“These [civilian review
board advocates] will never be satisfied unless there are nine Negroes and Puerto Ricans on the board
and every policeman who goes in front of it is found guilty.”).
297 RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 71.
298 Id.
299 ALBERT, supra note 286, at 41–42.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 41. White was popular with Boston’s Black voters. He garnered eighty percent of the Black
vote in the 1967 election. Martha Wagner Weinberg, Boston’s Kevin White: A Mayor Who Survives, 96
POL. SCI . Q. 87, 92 (1981).
302 ALBERT, supra note 286, at 41–42, 45.
303 Id. at 42.
304 Id.
305 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 244.
306 Id. at 275.
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Commission, sociologist Albert Reiss shared the results of his study on
police prejudice. He found that more than fifty percent of all officers
working in high crime areas displayed “extreme prejudice against” Black
people in that they labeled them as animals.307
Such intense hatred cannot be cabined off so as to not affect judgments
on the street and inside the workplace. The racial animus in policing
practices that contributed greatly to discord between Black community
members and law enforcement was not just limited to the street. Officers,
emboldened and unchecked, violently displayed their racism at a Brooklyn
courthouse in 1968.308 There, members of the Law Enforcement Group and
the White Tigers—groups of NYPD officers also connected with the PBA—
attacked a group of Black Panthers appearing on charges at a Brooklyn
courthouse.309 About 150 off-duty officers violently attacked a “small
number” of Black Panther members and supporters from the Students for a
Democratic Society present for preliminary hearings for three Black
Panthers accused of previously assaulting police.310 The group of white
police officers who launched the attack carried guns on their hips and were
readily recognized as law enforcement.311 Some were personally recognized
by news reporters, others were overheard discussing arrests they had made,
and an unidentified police officer acknowledged the presence of his
colleagues.312 In addition to nightstick blows and kicks that left the Black
Panthers and their supporters bloody, the gang of white officers reportedly
shouted “White Power” and “White Tigers eat Black Panthers.”313
The group cohesion identified by police scholars as a leading factor in
the popularity of police associations generally fails to acknowledge how that
cohesion could be based on notions of racial superiority and not simply
professional employment. Racial and ethnic intolerance pervaded inside
station houses.314 Some Black officers understood the depth of racism within
their own police departments during the 1960s. Affinity groups for Black
307

KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 89, at160.
David Burnham, Off Duty Police Here Join in Beating Black Panthers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1968, at 1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1968/09/05/77311558.pdf.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Jarrod Shanahan, “White Tigers Eat Black Panthers:” New York City’s Law Enforcement
Group, GOTHAM CTR. FOR N. Y. CITY HIST. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/whitetigers-eat-black-panthers-new-york-citys-law-enforcement-group; see also RUCHELMAN, supra note 94,
at 72–74 (discussing NYPD’s LEG and its connections to the John Birch Society); SKOLNICK, supra note
75, at 277 (discussing LEG’s involvement in the attack on Black Panthers at the Brooklyn courthouse).
314 See John Darnton, Color Line a Key Police Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1969, at 1,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/09/28/89379875.pdf (describing the racial
division and animosity between police officers). Black officers were incensed by the brutality they
witnessed white officers inflict on Black people. White officers were outraged by the influx of young
Black officers who spoke out against racism. Id.
308
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officers organized in order to protect themselves and Black community
members from racist police practices.315 By 1969, Black police officer
associations were formed in at least eight big cities including New York,
Philadelphia, and Boston.316 The organizations expressed concern about
“white policemen beating [B]lack prisoners, use of police dogs in civil
disturbances, . . . and alleged prejudicial recruiting practices by police
departments.”317 The New York City Guardians, made up of some 1,360
members, did not approve of the PBA’s full-scale attack against civilian
oversight and sought to prevent them from using their dues in the
seven-figure campaign.318 John Cassese, head of the PBA, accused the
Guardians of putting their skin color before their oath of office.319 His
comment confers the extent to which white policemen in the 1960s equated
policing with anti-Blackness.
3. Larger Public Gives Unions Strong Support
White community members expressly rejected efforts to secure political,
economic, and social liberation efforts for Black people throughout the
1960s.320 For every white person who supported sit-ins, voter drives,
Freedom Rides, and even the March on Washington, two white people
opposed these efforts.321 The police unions were reflective of the militant
mindset found in northern ethnic neighborhoods.322 Public animosity against
racial progress demands in New York and Philadelphia was closely aligned
with union efforts to ignore and discredit the same. In 1964, large crowds of
white people attacked sixteen members of the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE) as they protested outside a New York police precinct in the wake
of fifteen-year-old James Powell’s killing by an off-duty police officer.323
Subsequent large public support for the NYPD PBA’s strong opposition to
315

BURPO, supra note 114, at 11–12.
Id.
317 Id.
318 JURIS & FEUILLE, supra note 82, at 168; Thomas A. Johnson, Negro Policemen Split with P.B.A.
over Review, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1966, at 39, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/
1966/10/04/82519335.pdf.
319 Homer Bigart, 5,000 Policemen Picket City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1965, at 1,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1965/06/30/106995644.pdf (“It’s unfortunate [the
Guardians] put color before their oath of office.”).
320 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 187 (detailing polling data). One may ask how federal legislation
codifying civil rights protections for Black people was possible in light of the lack of public support from
white people. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524–25 (1980) (discussing how decision makers in the
United States championed civil rights progress as a means of improving the nation’s image nationally
and internationally).
321 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 186.
322 Id. at 225.
323 Teen-Agers Throw Eggs at CORE Unit Picketing the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 1964),
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/22/archives/teenagers-throw-eggs-at-core-unit-picketing-thepolice.html.
316
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community oversight just months after the attack on CORE makes it difficult
to dismiss the violence as animosity from a minority of white militants.
Public allegiance to law and order in the North was a natural component
of support for police union demands.324 White community members and the
president of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) in Philadelphia voiced
strong support for the heavy-handed, anti-Black police practices against
Black liberation efforts in that city.325
Philadelphia police, under the direction of Frank Rizzo, used violent
police tactics in response to Black demonstrators engaged in constitutionally
protected protests on at least two occasions during protests against
discrimination in education. The first involved police clubbing and arresting
those protesting an all-white boarding school in the heart of Black North
Philadelphia in 1965.326 The sight of Rizzo’s bloody hand after the police
clubbing prompted praise from John Harrington, president of the FOP.327 He
declared that Rizzo was “an outstanding example of one of our best
policemen,” and encouraged the mayor to reward Rizzo with a
commendation.328 The second occurred in 1967 when a large group of high
school students led a demonstration outside of the local school board in an
effort to gain more Black teachers, the addition of an African American
history course, and the ability to host culturally-relevant celebrations.329
Rizzo escalated the demonstration and ordered his officers to “Get their
black asses!”330 instead of allowing the school board president, former
Mayor Dilworth, to negotiate a resolution with student leaders. The school
superintendent described the beatings as a “police riot” and a diverse

324

BURPO, supra note 114, at 14.
Timothy J. Lombardo, Civil Rights and the Rise of Frank Rizzo in 1960s Philadelphia , PA.
LEGACIES , Fall 2018, at 14, 16–17 (portraying an image of a postcard from a community member
praising Frank Rizzo’s response the “Black power”; and detailing how the president of Philadelphia’s
Fraternal Order of Police union, John Harrington, requested a mayoral commendation for Rizzo based
on his view of the Police Commissioner being “an outstanding example of one of our best policemen”;
and stating, “Rizzo’s confrontations with militant civil rights leaders made him a hero to the
Philadelphians who demanded ‘law and order.’”). PAOLANTONIO, supra note 174, at 94 (quoting John
Harrington, FOP president and lead plaintiff in the litigation against the Philadelphia’s Police Advisory
Board, as saying, “If Rizzo is fired, we policeman (sic) would just turn our heads, collect our pay, and
let the people police themselves”).
326 See COUNTRYMAN , supra note 164, at 170–71, 178–79 (describing the daily picket lines outside
of Girard College from May 1 to December 18, 1965, in response to the city’s obfuscation of its role as
a public entity administering the estate of the founder, a segregationist, by later turning over the board to
a private group of alumni in an effort to frustrate the spirit of Brown v. Board of Education); see also,
Lombardo, supra note 325, at 16–17 (on the Girard College demonstrations and police union support of
Rizzo’s physically violent police practices).
327 Lombardo, supra note 325, at 17.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.; see also COUNTRYMAN , supra note 164, at 226 (describing television news coverage with
witnesses recounting hearing Rizzo use those words when giving the order).
325
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coalition of groups decried Rizzo’s violent treatment of the students.331 The
FOP joined other groups in defending the attack by police. People from
Philadelphia’s white working-class communities voiced strong support for
Rizzo’s aggressive and violent policing, denigrated Dilworth as a “fool,” and
thanked God for Rizzo in letters to the school board.332 The strong public
support is identified as one of the main factors in Rizzo being permanently
named as police commissioner the following month.333
Public support, and some might say incitement, of police violence
against Black liberation proponents was not limited to New York and
Philadelphia.334 The two cities are highlighted here as a part of the overall
focus on these cities within this Article.
III. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Law enforcement was generally not held accountable for the harmful
brutality it waged against Black people.335 As discussed in Part I, changing
that was a key objective of the Black liberation movement during the 1950s
and 1960s. Efforts by Black leaders and community members to hold police
accountable for excessive force through criminal prosecution were generally
unsuccessful.336 And proponents of external community oversight boards
suffered significant defeats to police unions during the first half of the 1960s.
Those realities during the mid-1960s signaled that aggressive police
practices would go unchecked at polling locations and with local jurists in
northern cities. Police unions used that popularity and political power to
fortify their strength in the form of collective bargaining rights. In just four
years, from 1965 to 1969, police unions gained collective bargaining rights
in twelve states.337 These states were all located in the northern and western
parts of the country that experienced rapid growth in their population of
Black residents during the five years prior.338 This section details some

331 Lombardo, supra note 325, at 17; see also RUCHELMAN, supra note 94, at 36 (describing those
who disapproved of Police Commissioner Rizzo’s attack on the students and detailing how the mayor and
others tasked with evaluating claims of police brutality against the Black students failed to investigate).
332 Lombardo, supra note 325, at 16–17; Timothy J. Lombardo, Civil Rights and the Rise of Frank
Rizzo in 1960s Philadelphia, HIST. SOC’Y OF PA. (Jan. 25, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://hsp.org/blogs/fondlypennsylvania/civil-rights-and-rise-frank-rizzo-1960s-philadelphia (displaying letters to the school board).
333 Lombardo, supra note 325, at 19.
334 E.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, AMERICA ON FIRE 70–71 (discussing the more than 17,000 letters and
telegrams received by the LAPD for guerilla warfare tactics used in the Watts neighborhood).
335 See, e.g., SILVAN NIEDERMEIER, THE COLOR OF THE THIRD DEGREE: RACISM, POLICE TORTURE,
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1930–1955 (Paul Allen Cohen trans., 2019).
336 E.g., HILL, supra note 201, at 39 (discussing the U.S. Department of Justice refusal to prosecute
Rochester officers for the beating of a uniformed gas station attendant); Wolfinger, supra note 162, at 6
(noting that in Philadelphia the NAACP advocated for police to be subject to the same criminal
prosecutions as non-police affiliated community members).
337 See supra notes 115–34 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
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instances of how unions used this surge of political power as a direct
response to the Black Power movement.
A. Blue Power vs. Black Power
Today it is not uncommon to see and hear the declaration “Blue Lives
Matter.”339 The phrase entered America’s public and political discourse as
a pro-police response to the Black Lives Matter movement. 340 The framing
of police officers as the oppositional juxtaposition to that of a racial
group—specifically Black people—through an ill-fitting misnomer is a
current-day echo of the 1960s “Blue Power” 341 response to the
pronouncement of “Black Power.”
Historical accounts and statements from police association leadership
during the sixties indicate that officers saw themselves as a class of people
rather than individuals fulfilling a role through voluntary employment.342
This is somewhat akin to what social scientists surmised in the 1960s about
the group cohesion of police officers.343 Yet for distinct purposes. David
Sklansky recounts that researchers deemed the tendency of police officers to
339 Embedded in the assertion to the existence and value of a “Blue” life is the notion that being a
police officer is a right and an identity that deserves protected class status. This raises questions of the
current-day relevance of Justice Holmes’s statement that an individual “has no constitutional right to be
a policeman.” McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). Nevertheless,
beginning in 2016, at least six states passed so-called “Blue Lives Matter” laws identifying law
enforcement officers as a protected class of victims because of their profession. See LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:107.2(A) (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1204 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. § 532.031 (West 2017);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-301 (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.9 (2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.014 (West 2017); See also India Thusi, Essay, Blue Lives and the Permanence of Racism,
105 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE, 14, 26 (discussing how “‘Blue Lives Matter’ language can only be
understood as a response to Black Lives Matter . . . [that seeks to] undermine attempts to empower Black
bodies by limiting an unconditional recognition of Black humanity,” and how the pronouncement that
“Blue” lives matter seeks to negate the statement that Black lives matter). See generally Frank Rudy
Cooper, Cop Fragility and Blue Lives Matter, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 621 (2020) (contextualizing “Blue
Lives Matter” as a fragile response to recent critiques of law enforcement).
340 See Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2022) (detailing the origins and purpose of Black Lives Matter). The phrase was popularized by
Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi, who started the hashtag and organized to spur a political
movement in 2013 after George Zimmerman followed, attacked, shot, and killed seventeen-year-old
Trayvon Martin in his family’s housing development in Sanford, Florida. Id.; Reis Thebault, Trayvon
Martin’s Death Set Off a Movement That Shaped a Decade’s Defining Moments, WASH. POST (Feb. 25,
2022, 6:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/02/25/trayvon-martins-death-set-offmovement-that-shaped-decades-defining-moments/.
341 Bopp, supra note 113, at 5–6 (describing militant officers during the 1960s as “following the
lead of other power movements” in the quest for higher wages, an end to external oversight by community
members, and the use of name badges; also describing Blue Power tactics as strikes, work stoppages,
slowdowns, and “overt and covert political involvement”); See also “Blue Power,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1968, at 46, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1968/10/24/76938022.pdf (describing
NYPD officers as chanting “Blue Power” outside of New York City Hall and demanding a premium pay
above other public employee collective bargaining groups in the city).
342 See Alexander, supra note 84, at 41.
343 See JURIS & FEUILLE , supra note 82, at 22–26.
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cleave and protect one another as creating the need for external oversight
and accountability.344 Officers, determined to mimic what they considered
to be a successful civil rights strategy, declared that the staggered eight-hour
shifts subjected them to “oppressive” work conditions.345 Blurring the lines
between identity demographics and job duties allowed police associations to
garner public support through an “us versus them” narrative where Black
people (and those supporting them) were deemed the enemy.346
Police union organizers quickly co-opted the organizing strategies of
Black liberation leaders during the 1960s.347 This was true despite the
unabashed racial animus historically connected with the profession. Law
enforcement had long operated under anti-Black sentiment and with open
racial animus. Interviews published in the 1950s and 1960s reveal that
officers openly conveyed hostility against Black people.348 These viewpoints
are reflected in assorted commission and researcher reports dating back to
1935.349 Racism aside, police unions openly adopted the language of the
Black liberation movement and sought to analogize their conduct with that
of the movement. Police union demonstrations took the form of strikes, work
slowdowns, department-wide sick-outs (commonly referred to as the “blue

344

David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1735 (2005).
BURPO, supra note 114, at 83; see also SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 278 (describing how union
organizing included a component of police viewing themselves as “an independent, militant minority”);
Bopp, supra note 113, at 6 (quoting the president of the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association as saying,
“We were sick of being thrown to the dogs. Our militancy started when everyone else’s became accepted”).
346 The use of victimhood status in framing the “us vs. them” response to Black liberation demands
also proved fruitful to police interests. Minneapolis police officer-turned-mayor Charles Stenvig was able
to capitalize on the “emerging discourse of victimhood among Minneapolis’s white, working-class
population that rejected what they perceived as the differential treatment minority groups received.”
Jeffrey T. Manuel & Andrew Urban, “You Can’t Legislate the Heart”: Minneapolis Mayor Charles
Stenvig and the Politics of Law and Order, AM. STUDIES, Fall/Winter 2008, 195, 208 (2008). The authors
also detailed how “Stenvig’s appeal to white victimhood suggests that Minneapolis residents had
embraced alternative identities that were in direct opposition to liberal policies that presented African
Americans as the true victims of social problems.” Id. at 209.
347 Bopp, supra note 113, at 5, 17 (describing how police “are following the lead of other power
movements” and “[p]olice activism is inextricably bound up with the black nationalist and student
radical movements”).
348 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 242–43.
349 See MAYOR LAGUARDIA’S COMMISSION ON THE HARLEM RIOT OF MARCH 19, 1935, THE
COMPLETE REPORT OF MAYOR LAGUARDIA’S COMMISSION ON THE HARLEM RIOT OF MARCH 19, 1935
(Arno Press 1969) (1936); Westley, supra note 169, at 40 (detailing the research interviews of officers
revealing racial and class prejudice among officers who “believe that certain groups of persons [Negroes
and slum dwellers] will only respond to fear and rough treatment”); Burton Levy, Cops in the Ghetto: A
Problem of the Police System, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, March 1968, 31, 31 (1968) (summarizing his
research position that the police system itself is the problem that money and training will not remedy
because the system “recruits a significant number of bigots, reinforces the bigotry through the
department’s value system and socialization with older officers, and takes the worst of the officers and
puts them on duty in the ghetto, where the opportunity to act of the prejudice is always available”).
345
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flu”), and public intimidation of elected officials.350 John Cassese, president
of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association in New York, was known for
ordering his officers to openly defy directives from the police commissioner
and mayor.351 To be clear, there was a period of time before the mid-to-late
1960s when the majority of officers had legitimate grievances about the low
pay and extended work shifts.352
As discussed earlier, those conditions changed rapidly through lobbying
and the passage of collective bargaining statutes.353 Police unions were
buoyed by those successes and added public campaigns and lawsuits to
further their agenda that extended far beyond compensation and benefits.354
Unlike the expansive purpose of sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and protests outside
of schools and government buildings, police union efforts were aimed at
restricting the freedom and rights of Black people. While the first half of the
decade brought police union attacks against elected officials’ efforts to
protect the civil rights of Black community members,355 the second half
brought police officials directly attacking Black liberation leaders.356
Critics of police practices were targeted by union leaders and police
heads. Those demanding Black freedom from police abuses were labeled
threats to the American way of life.357 Stokely Carmichael’s articulation of
“Black Power” in 1966 created a common enemy for already-established
police associations.358 The enemy (or threat) was not just Carmichael the
individual, though he was certainly identified as such by the media and law
350 E.g., Bopp, supra note 113, at 6; Alexander, supra note 84, at 40 (both discussing tactics used
by police unions to secure demands); SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 284–85 (discussing how the right-wing
faction within NYPD’s union sat in the courtrooms of disfavored judges to intimidate them); BURPO,
supra note 114, at 81 (detailing how the Fraternal Order of Police placed an advertisement in The Plain
Dealer openly questioning Mayor Stokes’s directives); SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 244 (describing how
union officials posted Mayor Stokes’s photo in district stations throughout the city accompanied by the
message “Wanted for Murder”).
351 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 276–77.
352 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
353 See supra Section I.B.
354 See supra Section II.B.
355 See supra Section II.A.
356 See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text.
357 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY , supra note 17, at 28 (describing how those seeking
community oversight of police were a threat to “law and order”). Local police departments and federal
law enforcement agencies doggedly pursued Black liberation leaders during the 1960s and beyond. J.
Edgar Hoover launched, in collaboration with local police, the FBI counterintelligence operation
“COINTELPRO.” See supra note 67. Hoover was quoted on July 16, 1969, as stating, “[T]he Black
Panther Party, without question, represents the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.” J.
Edgar Hoover: Black Panther Greatest Threat to U.S. Security UPI (July 16, 1969), https://www.upi.com/
Archives/1969/07/16/J-Edgar-Hoover-Black-Panther-Greatest-Threat-to-US-Security/1571551977068/;
see also David Burnham, F.B.I.’s Informants and “Bugs” Collect Data on Black Panthers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1969, at 1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/12/14/91293185.pdf
(describing how federal intelligence official reports collected information on the Black Panthers during
the summer of 1966).
358 RHONDA Y. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 73.
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enforcement officials, but most importantly the organizations connected to
those articulations of Black liberation and equality.359 The Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), led by Carmichael in the
mid-1960s, served as a primary target.360
Frank Rizzo marshalled the full force of the Philadelphia Police
Department against the SNCC in 1966. In doing so, he also capitalized on
the anti-Black liberation sentiment to garner popular support.361 Rizzo
openly committed to eradicating the Black Power movement shortly after
Carmichael’s June 1966 speech.362
While serving as acting police commissioner during the vacation of the
permanent commissioner during August of that year, and with the support
of Mayor Tate, Rizzo executed raids on four different North Philadelphia
residences one early morning.363 He claimed the local SNCC organizers had
enough dynamite in their possession to blow up Independence Hall. 364 At
least eighty officers were called in to conduct the raids.365 The strong display
of police power netted two sticks of dynamite at a location later determined
to not be connected to SNCC or its members.366 The charges were dropped
against all but one of the nine individuals arrested.367 There is no indication
of any inquiry into Rizzo’s basis for the raids.368
359

Journalists fed into the enemy combatant narrative. See Press Conference, Attorney General
Ramsey Clark (Jan. 20, 1968) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/
legacy/2011/08/23/01-20-1968.pdf) (describing how several questions were posed regarding the violence
and troublemaking of Black people who were named or referenced, including Stokely Carmichael,
H. Rap Brown, and Martin Luther King, Jr. (depending upon context)).
360 Philadelphia was not alone in its targeting of SNCC during 1966. See Carmichael v. Allen, 267
F. Supp. 985, 987–90 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (reciting events during the Atlanta protest in September 1966
following the shooting of Harold Louis Prather as he ran away from officers seeking to arrest him on a
theft warrant); see also Wilson A. Grady-Willis, Black Power in the South: Urban Protest and
Neighborhood Activism in Atlanta, Georgia, 1966–1969, PRÉSENCE AFRICAINE NOUVELLE SÉRIE,
No. 161/162, 2000, at 328, 331 (summarizing interviews of witnesses to the Prather shooting who
recounted that Prather was unarmed and running toward the home of his mother, who stood on the porch
pleading with officers not to shoot).
361 PAOLANTONIO, supra note 174, at 84–85.
362 Id. at 91–94 (quoting Rizzo, following the “police riot” described supra notes 329–31, as saying,
“The only thing these black power leaders understand . . . is force.”).
363 Id. at 84–85
364 Lombardo, supra note 325, at 17.
365 PAOLANTONIO, supra note 174, at 85.
366 Id.
367 Id.; Terence Cannon, Attempt to Smash SNCC in Philly Backfires: 1,000 Cops with Machine
Guns “Find” 2½ Sticks of Dynamite in Philadelphia, Try to Pin It on SNCC, MOVEMENT, Sept. 1966, at
1, 1, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/community.28040887.pdf; Lombardo, supra note 325,
at 17. Stokely Carmichael’s subsequent visit to Philadelphia was tracked and surveilled by the FBI.
Stokely Carmichael, FBI RECORDS: THE VAULT, pt. 5, at 7–9 https://vault.fbi.gov/
Stokely%20Carmichael (last visited Oct. 21, 2022). https://vault.fbi.gov/Stokely%20Carmichael/
Stokely%20Carmichael%20Part%205%20of%205.
368 Raids on the headquarters and residences of other Black liberation organizations became
common during the late 1960s. The headquarters of the St. Louis Liberators was damaged under a barrage
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B. The Politics of Law and Order
America’s system of government relies on the election of local officials
such as mayors, prosecutors, and judges. It is the responsibility of those local
elected officials to ensure their law enforcement department complies with
the law and is held accountable for any criminal violations and
administrative misconduct.369 Prior to police unionization, law enforcement
officials had long used politics to further their interest of self-policing and
preferential governance. These leaders negotiated the ability to exercise
unilateral decision-making in exchange for accepting appointed positions.370
During the early part of the twentieth century, proponents of professionalism
deemed it essential to remove political influence from law enforcement in
order to improve the ranks.371 The push to be free of political corruption has
resulted in law enforcement that goes relatively unchecked. Law
enforcement officials rejected any and all civilian input or direction.372 This
rejection occurred in ways that were quiet and unknown, such as sworn
officials co-opting elected and appointed civilians.373 And it has taken the
form of aggressive public campaigns against elected officials interested in
more democratic police oversight.374 In some cities, as discussed below,
police union rejection of certain initiatives and political candidates during
the 1960s contained an unmistakable racial animus.
Police unions now exercise political power to influence law enforcement
policies in ways previously deemed disadvantageous to corruption-free
government. As the political influence and power of police unions grew,
union officials and department heads used that power to mold city
leadership. In some instances, as described above, police unions and
associations flexed their political strength to destroy the policies created to
balance the needs of marginalized, Black community members and those of
law enforcement.375 In others, as described in this section, union leaders and
police head executives used their political popularity to become elected and
of police gunfire in September 1968. KENNETH S. JOLLY, BLACK LIBERATION IN THE MIDWEST: THE
STRUGGLE IN ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, 1964–1970, at 164. More widely covered was the assassination of
Fred Hampton by Chicago Police in December 1969. See Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., Plaintiffs in Panther
Suit “Knew We Were Right,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/14/us/
plaintiffs-in-panther-suit-knew-we-were-right.html.
369 William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1982 (2008).
370 Cray, supra note 257, at 54.
371 Id.
372 See supra Section II.A.
373 An example of this can be seen in the tenures of New York City Police Department’s civilian
police commissioners prior to the 1960s. Ed Cray identified Francis Adams, Stephen Kennedy, Michael
Murphy, and Vincent Broderick as four civilian commissioners in that city who were co-opted by sworn
personnel in that department and served as “figureheads for police administrators.” Cray, supra note
257, at 55.
374 See supra Subsection II.B.1.
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high-ranking police officials. Police power reached a high point in 1968,
with the year being billed as “The Year of the Cop.”376
In Cleveland, Carl Stokes was elected the first Black mayor of a major
U.S. city in November 1967.377 Strokes drew strong ire from the local police
associations with his response to an exchange of gunfire in July 1968
between white police officers and Fred Evans, a Black Army veteran.378 The
shots led to the deaths of three officers, three community members, and
began what became known as the Glenville uprising.379 Stokes de-escalated
the conflict by removing white officers from the streets during the conflict
and called on Black liberation leaders to restore peace.380 Peace was restored
in the community, but racism within the police department was unleashed.
Officers were heard making racist remarks about the mayor on patrol
radios.381 They also defied his orders to patrol the east side of Cleveland in
integrated two-man cars.382 The onslaught of police attacks was followed by
an erosion of Stokes’s white voter support. Officers not in uniform openly
displayed weapons while challenging Black voters at the polls during
Stokes’s 1969 re-election.383
Police union power and popularity proved important to Minneapolis
elections in 1969. Charles Stenvig was a forty-one-year-old detective in the
Minneapolis Police Department who was also serving as the local police
federation’s president when he decided to run as an independent for
mayor.384 He won sixty-two percent of the vote in the 1969 race after vowing
to “take the handcuffs off the police” and “to crack down on racial militants”
and others.385 His mayoral record indicates that squashing efforts to address
police abuse was all he did.386 Stenvig pledged to subvert City Council
efforts to create a civilian review board.387 In response to a critic’s position
that government should provide programs to address social ills, Stenvig
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provided an ironic retort that “you can’t legislate the heart.”388 Of course,
many American laws are based on moral expectations and standards.389
Stenvig, in fact, did attempt to govern the hearts and minds of people as he
sought to have certain material banned from the library.390
Frank Rizzo’s violent disregard for Black Philadelphians made him very
popular with white community members.391 Rizzo rose through the ranks of
the Philadelphia Police Department despite his suspected connections to the
Italian mob and strife with other ethnicities.392 Mayor Tate first appointed
Rizzo to serve as deputy commissioner and tasked him with preventing more
white flight as a part of Tate’s re-election strategy.393 Tate rewarded Rizzo’s
brute-force response to those protesting educational discrimination and
demanding Black liberation by naming him police commissioner in May
1967.394 The mayor and his new commissioner agreed that Rizzo would have
free rein over the city’s policing decisions without any input or interference
from the mayor.395 During his re-election campaign, Tate used images of
Rizzo “rounding up a group of young [B]lacks” on the street, in riot-like
gear breaking through a group of Black protestors picketing a white business
and leading a pack of officers “breaking into the headquarters of the
Revolutionary Action Movement.”396 Rizzo was credited with handing Tate
388
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a narrow victory over his opponent.397 His anti-Black policing led him to the
position of “Top Cop.” It would next deliver him the mayor’s seat. 398
IV. SOLUTIONS
The problem of racially disproportionate police violence is
longstanding. Decades of scholarship and research have been devoted to
understanding the root causes of the problem and devising solutions. As
detailed in this Article, police efforts to shield local law enforcement from
public oversight carried with them explicit and implicit racism. Racial
animus was harbored by officers in American cities to researchers and
journalists during the sixties.399 Though it is rare today for such animus to
be openly expressed, research supports the racially disparate impact of
police violence on Black people. There exists a critical need for a solution
designed to remove police union contract impediments to police
accountability. This section explores two possible solutions. The first briefly
examines the uphill battle presented by a litigation strategy based on an
equal protection framework. The second proposes, instead, a renewed focus
on how the federal government can buttress current reform efforts with
conditional-spending requirements.
A. Equal Protection and Disparate Impact
The intractable presence of racism in American policing defies the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Substantial research strongly
indicates that Black people are disproportionately affected by police
violence and misconduct.400 It is documented that officers with histories of
excessive force and other serious misconduct complaints have remained
employed as officers. Their employment status as peace officers provides
them with the authority to use deadly force. As discussed earlier,
high-profile killings of Black people have been at the hands of officers with
troubling employment histories.401 Collective bargaining provisions in
police union contracts are credited, at least partially, with preventing the
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discipline or termination of such officers.402 A valid question exists as to
whether the discriminatory impact of certain police union contract
provisions can be challenged as violative of Equal Protection rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
A successful challenge to collective bargaining provisions and other
systems that undermine police accountability may likely require one to
establish that those systems reflect intentional discrimination. Without doing
so, equal protection claims that successfully show certain union contract
provisions have a racially disparate impact because officers cannot be held
accountable may nevertheless fail if evidence does not exist to show that the
provisions were created with discriminatory intent.
The Court in Washington v. Davis403 and Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney404 makes it clear that only intentional discrimination
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Central to the dispute in Davis was a
written test that purportedly evaluated prospective D.C. officers’ “verbal
ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension.”405 Plaintiffs, who were
Black, filed suit alleging the entrance exam was discriminatory and violated
their Fifth Amendment due process rights.406 Four times as many Black
applicants failed the test than their white counterparts.407 Nevertheless, the
Court found that the test was sufficiently related to job performance.408 A
majority of the Court ruled the Court of Appeals erred by not requiring
plaintiff-applicants to show discriminatory intent.409
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney also involved an employment exam.
Feeney filed a § 1983 claim and alleged that a Massachusetts civil service
promotion statute violated the Equal Protection Clause in that it gave
preference to veterans; thereby discriminating against women job
applicants.410 Veterans received statutory preference even when they scored
below nonveteran employees on promotions exams.411 Feeney received the
second- and third-highest scores on two separate tests, only to be ranked
below male veterans with lower test scores for both positions.412 The Court’s
majority rejected Feeney’s claims because there was no dispute that the
statute was not intended to serve as a pretext for gender discrimination.413
402
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They did so despite two key details. First, state lawmakers passed the law
giving preference to veterans at a time when only two percent of veterans in
Massachusetts were women.414 Second, the legislative history revealed that
state lawmakers were aware of the negative impact the veteran-preference
system would have on women and decided to dull the impact for certain
“traditionally female occupations.”415
It should not be ignored that both Griggs v. Duke Power Co.416 and
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc.,417 make clear that a disparate impact claim can
violate a specific statute. But the Supreme Court has consistently held that
only an overwhelming disparate impact like those present in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins418 or Gomillion v. Lightfoot419 can support an inference of
intentional discrimination in an equal protection case. In the context of
policing, there is a strong argument to be made that equal protection
violation claims are unlikely to succeed unless only one white person is
impacted by police union contract provisions in a jurisdiction found to have
impeded officer accountability. The discriminatory-intent requirement
presents a high hurdle. Moreover, the use of plaintiff suits as a vehicle to
remedy police abuse has had little to no impact.420 The imbalance of power
and resources that exists between unions and already-marginalized plaintiffs
regarding contract provisions renders this possible solution unlikely to
provide significant, sustained reforms.
Exploring a solution not exclusively dependent upon litigation can be
pivotal. The following section explores how the federal government can
employ conditional-spending requirements to further its stated commitment
to increased police accountability.
B. Federal Conditional Spending
The federal government, through an extensive network of funding,
provides significant U.S. Treasury dollars to local police departments. 421 It
is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact number of federal dollars that
414
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flow either directly to local law enforcement agencies or indirectly from
their state governments.422 Recognizing that it exceeds the scope of this
Article to attempt such a full accounting of the national network of police
department funding, the following highlights are offered to provide some
level of context.
The federal government’s commitment to provide financial support to
law enforcement has been as constant over the last sixty years as police
brutality. In 1965, the federal government appropriated $10 million to state
and local law enforcement agencies under the Law Enforcement Assistance
Act.423 Three years later, the federal government passed the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and allocated at least $400 million over
two years to local law enforcement departments.424
President Biden’s proposed 2023 fiscal year budget calls for the federal
government to spend enormous dollars on state and local policing.425
Included are $472 billion in American Rescue Plan funds designated for
state and local policing to hired officers “for accountable community
policing.”426 This is on top of the regular funding not connected to the
one-time American Rescue Plan funds. Though Congress has not passed the
current proposed budget, actual dollars previously allocated through a web
of federal funding avenues provide a better context of actual dollars spent.
For fiscal year 2022, the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant program awarded
approximately $235 million in federal funding to state, local, and tribal
police agencies.427 During the same time period, the Community Oriented
Policing Services (commonly known as COPS) granted an excess of $512
million to the same.428 COPS reports providing more than $14 billion to
local, state, and tribal police agencies over its twenty-eight-year existence.429
One of COPS’s key objectives is to “build trust between law enforcement
and the communities served.”430 And in 2018, the Byrne Justice Assistance
422
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Grant program reportedly awarded $340 million dollars in federal funding
to state and local police agencies.431
Kami Chavis’s article, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform:
Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability,
provides an insightful and novel solution that should be revisited here.432 She
details the statutory authority and purpose of COPS funding and argues that
federal funding strategies have been “inadequate to address . . . police abuse
nationwide.”433 Chavis proposes an amendment to the COPS statute that
would add a conditional-spending clause to federal funding so as “to
promote police accountability.”434 Her proposal utilizes the four-part test in
South Dakota v. Dole435 as a framework for establishing a five percent limit
on the conditional spending.436 The Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius437
and other circuit court decisions involving American Rescue Plan funding
conditions have been made since the 2011 publication of Cooperative
Federalism. These additional lines of cases make it worth revisiting and
exploring the viability of conditional spending to address collective
bargaining provisions that impede police accountability.
The landmark decision in NFIB v. Sebelius may prompt some to view
conditional-spending requirements with some skepticism. 438 There, in
addition to upholding the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, the
Court found the Medicaid expansion provision of the Act was an
impermissible penalty under the Spending Clause. 439 At issue was the
federal government’s decision to condition the entirety of its Medicaid
reimbursements on whether states would provide coverage to all of its
eligible residents. 440 The Court found the one-hundred percent
conditional-spending funding to be impermissibly punitive. 441 The Court
declined to prescribe the tipping point for when a conditional-spending
requirement becomes an impermissible tax.442 But Chief Justice Roberts
chided the federal government with a reminder that the “power to tax is
not the power to destroy.”443
431
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The Court’s opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s partial concurrence went on
to detail why the four-part test from South Dakota v. Dole remains good case
law.444 That test requires that: (1) the spending is for general welfare; (2) the
spending condition is unambiguous; (3) the condition is relevant to the
purpose of the federal expenditure; and (4) the spending condition does not
violate any other Constitutional provision.445 NFIB provides some indication
of the outer limits as to when a condition may be deemed coercion, but
considering the one-hundred percent condition in that case, the percentage
itself is not particularly helpful. Samuel Bagenstos’s analysis of NFIB posits
that that the tipping point between permissive conditional spending and
impermissible coercion can be understood through evaluating the
anti-leveraging principle gleaned from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion.446
He proffers that principle as a test to determine whether conditional spending
is improperly coercive. Bagenstos’s principle defines coercion as the federal
government tying largely significant amounts of existing funding to new
participation in a “separate and independent program.”447
In the police union contract context, my proposal to place
conditional-spending requirements on local police agencies with pattern or
practices of discriminatory policing should survive under South Dakota v.
Dole and NFIB v. Sebelius.
Placing conditional-funding requirements on federal dollars to state and
local police agencies could help address collective bargaining provisions
that frustrate reform efforts. First, local governments committed to
developing trust and legitimacy in their police services must make sustained
allegations of racism a presumptively terminable offense. This should also
include sustained evidence of racially disparate improper use of force. The
FBI acknowledged in 2006 that white supremacist groups have infiltrated
American law enforcement agencies.448 There is no evidence that those
agencies have developed strategies to address the problem. But those who
consciously subscribe to beliefs that Black people and other people of color
are racially inferior are not the sole source of the problem. Officers who
demonstrate a pattern of opting to disproportionately use force against Black
people and other people of color should also be deemed unsuitable to work
in law enforcement. In order for the classification of racism and racially
disparate misconduct as presumptively terminable offenses to be effective,
departments will have to ensure that allegations of misconduct are
444
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investigated by skilled investigators in a timely and thorough manner. It will
also require that departments use sound data-collection practices to track,
review, and investigate the appropriateness of officer use of force.
The revisions should include the removal of provisions from local
collective bargaining agreements that impede accountability. They should
also include the addition of racial animus and patterns of racially based
improper policing as presumptively terminable offenses. The identification
of these offenses could be made in either the collective bargaining
agreement, disciplinary matrixes, or both.
CONCLUSION
Black people in America continue to be stopped and killed by police at
disproportionate rates.449 Collective bargaining contracts have been identified
as an impediment to ensuring that problematic officers are disciplined in a
manner that prevents them from repeatedly inflicting harm or simply being
terminated. As shown in prior research, those contracts contain disciplinary
provisions that insulate officers from effective investigations on allegations
of serious misconduct.450 Current-day contracts also contain provisions
regarding personnel file record-keeping and limitations on how long prior
misconduct can be considered in current disciplinary decisions.451 Those
current provisions and others impede the ability to remove unsuitable
employees from the sole profession in a democratic society that is authorized
to take the life or liberty of another without due process. This reality allows
the absence of trust and legitimacy within communities impacted by police
violence and misconduct to continue.
Policing that is simultaneously accountable to the people and the rule of
law is a hallmark of democracy.452 Communities throughout the United States
continue to demand that their elected and appointed officials hold police
accountable.453 As enforcers of the law, it is expected that they adhere to the
rule of law.454 Yet, American police—with the authority to singlehandedly
decide when to use deadly force and no consistent accountability measures
449

See supra sources cited note 400.
See Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 16; Fisk & Richardson, supra note 16.
451 Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 16, at 1228.
452 WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 17, at 7.
453 Carol A. Archbold, Police Accountability in the USA: Gaining Traction or Spinning Wheels?,
15 POLICING 1665, 1667 (2021) (“Many state political leaders are also responding to the renewed call
for police reform by passing legislation meant to increase police accountability. According to the Vera
Institute of Justice, 34 states and the District of Columbia passed 79 bills, executive orders, and
resolutions making changes to laws associated with police accountability in 2015 and 2016. This is a
notable increase as there were approximately 20 changes made to laws associated with police
accountability from 2012 to 2014.”) (citation omitted).
454 SKOLNICK, supra note 75, at 5–6 (discussing the expectation of some that police “adhere strictly
to the rules governing the legal system . . . [and] ultimately be accountable”); Richard J. Terrill, Police
Accountability in Philadelphia: Retrospects and Prospects, 7 AM. J. POLICE, no. 2, 1988, at 79, 79.
450

236

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1

for such force—have effectively been excluded from the control mechanism
purportedly inherent in the rule of law. Recent civil unrest and uprisings in
American cities have left many with questions regarding the intractable
nature of disproportionate police brutality in Black communities.455
But collective bargaining agreements alone are not the problem. Instead,
police union contracts have become a seemingly impenetrable
memorialization of racialized violence embedded in American policing.
Police brutality is a longstanding issue in America, especially in Black
communities.456 The Black liberation movement sought freedom from
government-sanctioned violence. That movement started before the
introduction of police union collective bargaining agreements., Nevertheless,
early contracts did nothing to address the problem. Indeed, modern
bargaining agreements serve to insulate sworn personnel from accountability.
The political power and public support that police unions garnered for
officers during the 1960s is the genesis of modern-day provisions.
There are still attempts to frame the American backlash following civil
rights progress as the rise of conservatism in response to Black
“militants.”457 Journalists and historians have long framed Black liberation
leaders and organizations as “militant.”458 This characterization was used not
just for organizations that promoted principles of self-defense in response to
white violence. It was also used to describe the struggle of Black liberation
leaders using nonviolent demonstrations and written publications to inform
their communities and others about the unequal, unjust, and uniformly
455 Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the United States by Age,
Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PNAS 16793, 16794 (2019) (finding that “Black men are about 2.5 times
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WASH. POST ( Oct. 7, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootingsdatabase/ (“Although half of the people shot and killed by police are [w]hite, Black Americans are shot at
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(opining that the majority of Black people killed by police are armed or dangerous and, therefore, more
police resources are necessary). See generally Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical Assessment of
Police Shootings, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 189 (2017) (using an analysis of 270 officer-involved shootings
in Chicago and documentation from the Independent Police Review Authority to assert that additional
factors beyond a comparison of a racial group’s overall population percentage to its people’s rate of being
shot by police may be helpful in determining the extent of racial disproportionality in police shootings).
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violent response they were experiencing in the employment, educational,
and law enforcement sectors.459 “Militant” is used to describe those who
sought to enjoy the freedom of their equal rights as articulated by the
Supreme Court and Congress. Recent scholarship makes the dangerous error
of equating local NAACP leader Cecil B. Moore’s nonviolent, direct-action
demonstrations with that of gun-toting, billy club–wielding Frank Rizzo’s
Philadelphia Police Department.460
American racial subjugation remains, even if in seemingly new and
evolved ways.461 This Article provides some accounts of a time when the
federal high court and several local and federal officials had begun to
institute laws and practices aimed at addressing racial oppression. The white
electorate responded in ways that showed they were not in support of those
advancements. Instead, white community members publicly sided with the
police who were protecting their interests. This evolved into more than the
traditional election of political candidates in favor of preserving America’s
racial hierarchy. It expanded to vocal support of a personified police force
as its own distinct cause.462 This is demonstrated not only by the election of
police leaders to the highest seat in municipal government, but also by the
passage of several state collective bargaining statutes that coincided with
police violence and uprisings in American cities during the 1960s.463
459 Id. at 16 (describing Cecil B. Moore’s marches and impassioned speeches against segregation
as “militant”); Jenice L. View, Brief Outline of the History of SNCC, C.R. TEACHING,
https://www.civilrightsteaching.org/voting-rights/brief-history-sncc (last visited Oct. 21, 2022)
(describing the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee as becoming “more militant”); David
Chappell, The Radicalism of Martin Luther King Jr.’s Nonviolent Resistance, WASH. POST (Jan 15, 2018,
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/01/15/the-radicalism-ofmartin-luther-kings-nonviolent-resistance/ (mentioning King’s “militant dedication to equality in
housing and the criminal justice system”).
460 Lombardo, supra note 325, at 16 (“Moore’s aggressive campaign and Rizzo’s equally aggressive
policing made for a volatile situation.”).
461 Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 363 (1992).
462 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-701(D)(15), 1204 (2022) (declaring that “[e]vidence that
the defendant committed the crime out of malice toward a victim because of the victim’s [employment as
a peace officer] is an aggravating factor”); Blue Lives Matter In Oklahoma Act of 2017, H.B. 1306, 56th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017) (amending Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.9 (2022), enhancing penalties for
first-degree murder); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701.7(E) (including “intentionally caus[ing] the death of a law
enforcement officer” in the definition of first-degree murder); see also the following unenacted legislation:
Blue Lives Matter Act of 2016, H.R. 4760, 114th Cong. (2016) (“A Bill to make an attack on a police
officer a [federal] hate crime, and for other purposes.”); Mississippi Blue Lives Matter Act, H.B. 640, 2017
Leg., 132d Sess. (Miss. 2017) (attempting to “include law enforcement officers, firefighters and emergency
medical personnel in the class of victims where offenses are subject to hate crime penalties; and for related
purposes”); Blue Lives Matter Act Of 2017, H.B. 25, 2017 Gen. Assemb., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017) (“For
the purpose of including law enforcement officers within the scope of certain prohibitions against
committing certain crimes against certain persons . . . and generally relating to hate crimes against law
enforcement officers.”); A Concurrent Resolution Urging the United States Congress to Enact the “Blue
Lives Matter Act of 2016”, Assemb. Con. Res. 188, 217th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2016).
463 Li Cohen, Former NYPD Police Captain Eric Adams Elected as Second Black Mayor in New York
City History, CBS NEWS (Nov. 3, 2021, 7:55 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/eric-adams-electednew-york-city-mayor-nypd/. The table in Section I.B, supra, contains the collective bargaining statutes.
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Racism remains the root cause of disparate outcomes in America.464
Indeed, local governments across the country have declared it a public health
crisis.465 American police unions promoted racist policing and targeted
Black liberation efforts. The impact of police union contracts cannot be fully
understood without recognizing that police departments across the country
were rewarded with collective bargaining rights during the historical
moment when racist policing was widely known and supported. It was
supported by voters who rejected efforts to hold officers accountable for
harassment and abuse of Black community members. It was also supported
by elected and appointed officials who negotiated contracts with police
unions and failed to include provisions that protected the interests of
marginalized and disproportionately impacted communities.
The Kerner Commission understood that police were more than a mere
trigger to the spate of Black uprisings during the 1960s.466 That insightful
and comprehensive report continues to be relevant today. It understood that,
for Black Americans, “police . . . symbolize white power, white racism, and
white repression. And the fact is that many police do reflect and express
these white attitudes.”467 What the report could not have known at the time
it was written is how collective bargaining rights would serve, over time, as
a protective shield to foster racist police practices and outcomes. Only ten
states had codified police collective bargaining rights by the time the report
was published. However, we now have a more complete understanding of
the role contract provisions have played in promoting racially disparate
police outcomes. This increased understanding should prompt the federal
government to demonstrate that it is willing to hold local agencies
accountable—just as it seemingly demands those same agencies hold police
officers accountable.

464 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black Disruption or Despair?,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 165 (1973); Khiara M. Bridges, Racial Disparities in Maternal Mortality, 95
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (2020); Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1485 (2004); Andrea Freeman, Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C.
L. REV. 1071, 1071 (2017); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Structural Racism and Health Disparities, Reconfiguring
the Social Determinants of Health to Include the Root Cause, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 518 (2020);
Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J.L.
& BIOSCIENCES, Jan.–June 2020, at 4 (arguing that structural racism in employment and housing led to
negative COVID-19 health outcomes for people of color); Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in
Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1219–20 (1998).
465 Christine Vestal, PEW: STATELINE, Racism Is a Public Health Crisis, Say Cities and Counties,
Say Cities and Counties (June 15, 2020) https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
blogs/stateline/2020/06/15/racism-is-a-public-health-crisis-say-cities-and-counties; Lilliann Paine et al.,
Declaring Racism a Public Health Crisis in the United States: Cure, Poison, or Both?, FRONTIERS IN
PUB. HEALTH, June 2021, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2021.676784/full.
466 KERNER COMMISSION , supra note 89, at 3.
467 Id. at 93.

